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 1 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:  
SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 
Nahal Kazemi * 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important and rapidly evolving issues in international law is the 
question of who has the authority to enforce it.1 Generally speaking, the Westphalian 
model of State sovereignty links the jurisdiction of a State to the territory it controls.2 
This territorial principle of jurisdiction provides that a State has the right to proscribe and 
punish behavior that occurs in its territory (or on its ships and aircrafts in international 
territory), regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim.3 Linking the power to 
“prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce” to state sovereignty has the effect of limiting juris-
dictional conflicts among States because in most cases it is clear which State has the abil-
ity to prosecute.4 International law, however, recognizes several exceptions to the gen-
eral proscription against extraterritorial jurisdiction. These exceptions are first, active 
personality principle–prosecution by a State of the actions of its citizens outside the 
State’s territory; secondly, passive personality principle–prosecution by a State of actions 
committed outside its territory against the State’s citizens or nationals; thirdly, protective 
principle–prosecution by a State of actions that threaten the State’s security or basic gov-
ernmental functions; and finally, universal jurisdiction.5 
While the first three are predicated on the basic sovereign rights and responsibili-
ties of the State, universal jurisdiction is not based upon vital interests of the prosecuting 
State.6 Arguments for universal jurisdiction instead tend to appeal to our better angels. 
Indeed, the philosophical justification often presented for universal jurisdiction is the no-
tion that some crimes are so heinous that they are crimes “erga omnes” or against all 
human beings.7 These crimes against all people can be properly prosecuted by any State, 
                                                          
 * Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State, J.D. cum laude Harvard Law School, 2004. The 
views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State or the U.S. Government.  
 1. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 94-95 (2001); see also HON. MARY ROBINSON, Foreword to 
THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 15-18 PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW AND 
PUB. AFFAIRS (2001). 
 2. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 89-90. 
 3. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 787-88 
(1988). 
 4. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 90. 
 5. Randall, supra note 3, at 787-88. 
 6. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 88; Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdic-
tion’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184 (2004). 
 7. Randall, supra note 3, at 823. 
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regardless of the situs of the acts, the nationality of the perpetrators or that of the vic-
tims.8 Under this construction of universal jurisdiction, universality is preserved for the 
most heinous crimes–genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.9 These are 
crimes which shock the conscience of the entire international community and their per-
petrators are “hostis humani generis” or enemies of all mankind.10 Proponents of univer-
sal jurisdiction point to the horrific nature of such crimes as a moral justification for a 
State to take the necessary action to prevent and prosecute the crimes, even when com-
mitted outside the territory of said State.11 
This idea of crimes erga omnes is fundamentally flawed in three ways. First, while 
enlightened moral reasoning might support the notion that the entire international com-
munity is the victim when genocide is committed, the practical reality is that the people 
of Rwanda were more affected by the Rwandan genocide of 1994 than the people of 
Sweden were. To deny this is to reduce 800,00012 separate incidences of horrific person-
al tragedy into an aggregated statistic and then diffuse that tragedy over the entire popu-
lation of a world revolted by the atrocities, but otherwise untouched by them. 
Second, the erga omnes model does not explain the application of universal juris-
diction to crimes like hostage-taking or hijacking.13 These crimes are not subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction based upon a jus cogens norm of international law.14 Instead, these are 
crimes of universal jurisdiction because States have entered into treaties declaring them 
as such. 
Third, the concept of crimes erga omnes can be traced back to the notion that pi-
rates on the high seas were the enemies of all mankind and thus subject to punishment by 
the authorities of any nation that captured them. Pirates, modern supporters of universal 
jurisdiction argue, were especially heinous criminals, condemned by the world at large, 
like today’s genocidaires and war criminals.15 The history of piracy and State response 
to it, however, belies the idea that piracy was viewed as a uniquely heinous crime.16 Pro-
fessor Eugene Kontorovich very convincingly deconstructed the assertion that piracy 
was viewed as particularly heinous. As Kontorovich explains, while States vigorously 
prosecuted pirates captured on the high seas, they also tended to conscript those very pi-
rates into service as privateers when it suited the State’s interests.17 Surely the crime of 
piracy would not cease to be morally repulsive simply because the pirates acted under 
                                                          
 8. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23-24, Princeton Univ. Program in L. and 
Pub. Affairs (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES]. 
 9. Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations against Inter-
national Crime, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT’L L. 1 (2000).   
 10. Randall, supra note 3, at 789. 
 11. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 16; Universal Jurisdiction: Questions and Answers, AMNESTY INT’L 
(2001), http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGIOR530202001. 
 12.  Rwandan Genocide: Some Key Facts, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2007) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/04/us-rwanda-genocide-idUSL048793620070404. 
 13. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 
[hereinafter Hijacking Convention]; see also International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 
1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention]. 
 14. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 125. 
 15. Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 184-86. 
 16. Id. at 210-13. 
 17. Id. 
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letters of marque. Kontorovich argues that if universal jurisdiction was to be based on 
moral outrage, justification for such jurisdiction could not be based on the fact that uni-
versal jurisdiction was exercised against pirates.18 
Contemporary examples bear out Professor Kontorovich’s point: stories of piracy 
off the coast of Somalia and in Indonesia bear witness to the fact that piracy is armed 
robbery on the seas.19 Reports indicate that the Somali pirates have generally taken care 
not to harm the crew of boarded vessels to ensure that the ransoms are paid.20 Certainly, 
piracy is a condemnable offense and a significant impediment to trade, but it is not clear 
that these contemporary acts of piracy “shock the conscience” of the entire international 
community. Claiming that universal jurisdiction is reserved for only the worst sorts of 
crimes and then lumping genocide and piracy together under the undifferentiated catego-
ry of “heinous” crimes diminishes the meaning of the word “heinous” and waters down 
our universal condemnation of genocide to nothing more than an international “tough on 
crime” approach. 
The purpose of this article is not to criticize or reject the concept of universal juris-
diction. To the contrary, this article is a defense of universal jurisdiction in certain lim-
ited instances, but based upon grounds of pragmatism, not moral outrage. Part I of the 
article will describe historical and modern instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction, as ex-
ercised by both sovereign States and international tribunals, and their stated rationales. 
Part II will analyze our application of universal jurisdiction to different types of crimes 
to demonstrate why “heinousness” is a poor standard for asserting universal jurisdiction 
and why our current approach to universal jurisdiction lacks coherence. Part III will posit 
an alternative basis for universal jurisdiction, correcting non-optimal levels of prosecu-
tion which occur in the absence of international enforcement, and will apply the optimi-
zation principle to several categories of crimes—some the readers will likely find to be 
heinous; others, more run-of-the-mill—best prosecuted with some level of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and cooperation.21 
PART I 
Universal jurisdiction is a peculiar departure from our ordinary notions of jurisdic-
tion and criminality. In general, State X has no authority to prosecute an individual for 
his actions in State Y (assuming the individual is not a national of State X). What State Y 
determines to be lawful and unlawful within its own borders is generally considered to 
be fully within the State’s prerogative as a sovereign entity.22 Furthermore, the State has 
practically limitless discretion in how it enforces its laws—it can make the prosecutions 
of some crimes a priority at the expense of other prosecutions. Given the broad notion of 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 236-37. 
 19. See Frank Gardner, Taking on Somalia’s Pirates, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7882618.stm. 
 20. Robyn Hunter, Somali Pirates Living the High Life, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm; Maxim Tkachenko, Russian Warship Apprehends Somali Pi-
rates, CNN (Feb. 13, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/02/13/somalia.pirates.free.ship/. 
 21. This is not to suggest that the nature of the crime is irrelevant; just that heinousness is not the only or 
even the most important variable in the calculus.   
 22. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 88-90; see also Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 184. 
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sovereignty, foreign jurisdictions do not generally go about enforcing another State’s 
criminal laws. As the exercise of universal jurisdiction can undermine another State’s 
sovereignty, strong rationale must be provided for this abrogation of the standard order.23 
Most commonly, scholars and activists have turned to the concept of crimes erga omnes 
and have focused on the particularly heinous nature of particular crimes as justification 
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.24 Some crimes, it is said, are so awful that they 
are crimes against the entire world;25 we are all diminished as human beings when one 
part of humanity is targeted for genocidal killings or mass rape. The fullest measure of 
our condemnation of such abhorrent crimes is to give all States the authority to prosecute 
them. 
International legal scholars are quick to point to the examples of piracy and slave 
trading as precedents for universal jurisdiction in justifying its use to prosecute crimes 
like genocide, war crimes, and torture.26 Some of these crimes have been specifically 
outlawed by treaty, others by customary international law. Universal jurisdiction over 
these crimes has developed in numerous ways, which will be analyzed in this section in 
turn. 
Jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity traces back to the Inter-
national Military Tribunals (“IMT”).27 The victors in World War II gained jurisdiction 
over the defendants as the occupiers of the defeated nations and prosecuted them for vio-
lations of existing obligations under customary international law, both within the territo-
ries of Japan and Germany, and in the nations they occupied during the war.28 Subse-
quent tribunals, constituted under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, 
and tribunals established by treaty, such as the International Criminal Court, have also 
exercised jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity.29 These crimes be-
came subject to a jus cogens norm of universal jurisdiction, granting all States the right 
to punish perpetrators. Since the end of World War II, additional crimes have become jus 
cogens crimes of universal jurisdiction, including torture and genocide. Universal juris-
diction over these crimes is not grounded in a specific treaty or covenant, but in the 
widespread, almost unanimous, recognition by States of the existence of such jurisdic-
tion. 
In the post-war period, other crimes became subject to universal jurisdiction 
through a different mechanism. Treaties such as the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
                                                          
 23. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 88-90. 
 24. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 23-27. 
 25. See ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 15-16. 
 26. See Randall, supra note 3, at 793-800. 
 27. See International Military Tribunal Charter, art. 6., Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279  [hereinafter IMT 
Charter]; Randall, supra note 3, at 800-01.  
 28. See IMT Charter, supra note 27; International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter art. 5., Jan. 19, 
1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20. 
 29. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 1, 3, 5, S.C. Res. 827, May 25, 
1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY]; see also Statute of the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda art. 1, 3, 4, S.C. Res. 955, Nov. 8 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR]; 
and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., art. 5, July 27, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* 
32 I.L.M. 1002 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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lawful Seizure of Aircraft can create explicit and compulsory universal jurisdiction.30 
These conventions include specific provisions requiring States to either try perpetrators 
of these crimes, or to extradite them to States that will try them.31 The growth and devel-
opment of universal jurisdiction via these different approaches has been uneven and dis-
jointed. Different methods of expanding and applying universal jurisdiction present their 
own difficulties and concerns regarding sovereignty, justiciability, legitimacy, and pre-
dictability.32 
A. Customary International Law-Based Jurisdiction 
The earliest applications of universal jurisdiction were not grounded in explicit 
treaty obligations, but in the evolving norms and customs of the laws of nations. Cus-
tomary international law is a product of State practice that is so universally recognized 
and adhered to as a matter of obligation that it attains the status of law on equal footing 
with a treaty or convention.33 It is extremely difficult to determine when a custom or 
habit among States becomes customary international law and, often times, the specific 
details and contours of a generally accepted legal obligation are difficult to define. Many 
principles of customary international law, including the law of the sea, for example, have 
been reduced into treaty form; they are reduced to treaty form in part to clarify rights and 
obligations that may have previously been vague.34 However, States have historically 
exercised jurisdiction over crimes that violate customary international law in the absence 
of such treaties. This section will consider those crimes subject to universal jurisdiction 
as a matter of customary international law. 
In general, customary international law has limitations: long time objectors are not 
bound by custom, changes in custom and State practice can result changes of the law, 
and treaties may modify existing customary international law. Some norms of interna-
tional law, however, are so important and so universally recognized that no State is able 
to object to them or to deviate from the standard. These are known as jus cogens laws.35 
All crimes subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law are 
now jus cogens crimes. The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction have identi-
fied these crimes as: “(1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace; 
(5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture.”36 Apartheid is sometimes al-
so considered to be in this category.37 While some of these crimes were considered sub-
ject to customary international law based on universal jurisdiction long before any treaty 
                                                          
 30. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Dec. 17, 1996, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention]; see also Hijacking Convention, supra 
note 13. 
 31.  See discussion of treaty-based crimes, infra at Part I.B. 
 32. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 23-25. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987); see also 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (noting that both treaties and 
customary law are binding forms of international law). 
 34. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see 
also Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.  
 35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, Jan. 27 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 36. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 29. 
 37. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 107-08.  
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regarding the conduct at issue entered into force, in the case of genocide, torture, and 
apartheid, the jus cogens acceptance of universal jurisdiction and the treaty regarding the 
conduct developed concurrently.38 
No matter the context, a State attempting to assert universal jurisdiction over a 
principle of customary international law faces a number of challenges. In the first in-
stance, any State attempting to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction must identify the cus-
tomary international law principle underpinning the claim of jurisdiction. Then, the State 
must demonstrate this principle of customary international law countenances, or at least 
tolerate the type of extraterritorial jurisdiction being exercised. This is especially so 
when no treaty or convention specifically calls for such exercise of jurisdiction.39 When 
States invoke universal jurisdiction, they typically appeal to longstanding practice or the 
heinousness of the crime at issue. The issue of prosecutions under a customary interna-
tional law regime is further complicated when the conduct in question, while prohibited 
by an international legal norm, was legal in the territory in which it occurred. 
1. Initial Applications of Universal Jurisdiction Under Customary International 
Law 
a. Piracy 
For hundreds of years, countries have exercised universal jurisdiction over crimi-
nal matters absent explicit treaty obligations to do so. For much of this time, piracy was 
the only crime subject to universal jurisdiction. Pirates have long been regarded as 
“hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”40 Universal jurisdiction over piracy 
was not tied to any treaty obligations, but has been recognized as legitimate by all major 
maritime powers for centuries.41 Since at least the early seventeenth century, any nation 
could try pirates they had captured, regardless of the pirates’ nationality, their victims’ 
nationality, the registry of the ships involved, or where in international waters the pirates 
were apprehended.42 
It is interesting to note that universal jurisdiction over pirates did not evolve be-
cause no one exercised jurisdiction over the high seas. For non-piracy related matters, 
jurisdiction over ships and individuals was, and still is, based upon their nationality. 
Ships are registered in a particular nation and are subject to its laws, even when at sea.43 
The crew and passengers of ships at sea are nationals of their own country and could be 
covered by the active or passive personality principles, which is dependent on whether 
they were victims or perpetrators of crimes at sea.44 The crime of piracy, thus, did not 
occur in a legal vacuum. The nation of registry of a ship could claim jurisdiction based 
upon territorial principles, and the State of citizenship of the victims could claim juris-
                                                          
 38. See id. at 120-25. 
 39.  See generally Xavier Philippe, The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How Do 
the Two Principles Intermesh?, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 862, 385-86 (June 2006). 
 40. Randall, supra note 3, at 789. 
 41. Id. at 791-92. 
 42. Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 190. 
 43. UNCLOS, supra note 34, at art. 91, 92; Convention on the High Seas, supra note 34, at art. 5. 
 44. Randall, supra note 3, at 793. 
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diction based on the passive personality principle. In addition, the nation of origin of the 
pirates themselves could claim active personality jurisdiction.45 Nonetheless, pirates 
could be arrested and summarily executed by whichever government managed to capture 
them.46 This universal jurisdiction over piracy continues today, though summary execu-
tion does not.47 
Scholars have relied upon the example of piracy to justify universal jurisdiction 
over other crimes. As discussed below, these scholars have typically analogized other 
crimes to piracy based upon the heinousness of the offense.48 This line of reasoning has 
been used to support the application of universal jurisdiction over terrorists, slave trad-
ers, and torturers.49 Genocidaires and war criminals became the new pirates, enemies of 
all mankind. The first step in this trend was the application of universal jurisdiction over 
slave traders. 
b. Slave Trade 
In the nineteenth century, Great Britain initiated a series of treaties with like-
minded nations, granting the signatories’ naval vessels the ability to search, capture, and 
detain ships believed to be involved in the slave trade and to try their crew on the crime 
of slave trading.50 The earliest of these treaties were merely hortatory, and declared the 
parties’ joint belief that the slave trade was incompatible with principles of justice and 
humanity.51 By 1817, Britain began negotiating bilateral treaties to suppress the slave 
trade, which included enforcement mechanisms. The earliest of these was the Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty of 1817, which granted both parties the right of “visitation,” for ex-
ample, to stop and search each other’s merchant vessels if they were suspected of carry-
                                                          
 45. While some commentators have argued that pirates and their ships lose their nationality and the protec-
tion of said nation as a result of piracy, such a blanket assertion would be incorrect. The 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas states, “[a] ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or air-
craft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was 
derived.” Convention on the High Seas, supra note 34, at art. 18.   
 46. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (noting “the general practice of all na-
tions in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence against any per-
sons whatsoever.”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 (1915-
1916) (observing that every community has a right to punish pirates). 
 47. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, at art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdic-
tion of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship . . . and arrest the persons and seize the property on board  
. . . [and] may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 3, at 798. 
 49.  Id. 
 50. See generally Webster Ashburton-Treaty art. 8, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 9, 1842, 8 U.S.T. 1867 T.S. 119 
No. 4; Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, U.S.-Gr. 
Brit., June 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225. One of the earliest treaties entered by Great Britain evidencing the desire of 
the parties to eradicate the slave trade was the Treaty of Ghent. The Treaty of Ghent declared the slave trade to 
be irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice and indicated that both the United States and Great 
Britain desired its abolition. It did not, however, create any new rights or obligations of either party with re-
spect to the slave trade. Great Britain and the United States entered into several later treaties which included 
not just the aspiration to end slavery, but obligations on both parties to undertake measures to suppress the 
slave trade by means of interdiction. Treaty of Ghent 1814, U.S.-Gr. Brit, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218.  
 51. Treaty of Ghent 1814, supra note 50, at art. 10; see also Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The 
Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 535 (2004) [hereinafter Byers, Policing] (describing 
other early nineteenth century bilateral treaties entered into by Great Britain which declared the slave trade to 
be immoral, but provided no powers to suppress it).   
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ing slaves.52 It is important to note the right of visitation was initially extended only to 
the ships of the signing parties, which was hardly a sweeping expansion of jurisdiction. 
Between 1817 and 1831, Britain signed similar treaties with Spain, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Norway, France, and a number of Latin American States.53 Ten years lat-
er, “Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria signed the Quintuple Treaty for the 
Suppression of the African Slave Trade . . . .”54 Unlike prior bilateral agreements, the 
Quintuple Treaty declared slavery to be an act of piracy. In calling the slave trade piracy, 
the signatories indicated their intent to extend universal jurisdiction over the crime of 
slave trading.55 
This extension of universal jurisdiction was not grounded in centuries of common 
State practice. Indeed, numerous nations, including the United States, rejected the right 
of interdiction and universal jurisdiction at that time.56 It was not until 1862 that the 
United States recognized a mutual right of interdiction with respect to the slave trade.57 
As such, the earliest attempts by Great Britain to suppress the slave trade cannot be 
viewed as application of customary international law. Britain worked for decades to 
achieve consensus among like-minded States before attempting to assert universal juris-
diction. In doing so, it did not analogize slave trading to piracy; it declared slave trading 
to be piracy. 
Some scholars have argued Britain’s initiation of bilateral and then multilateral 
treaties represented an emerging consensus among a group of States to subject the slave 
trade to universal jurisdiction because of the heinous nature of the crime.58 Others, how-
ever, argue convincingly that this emerging consensus was created by Great Britain, act-
ing over the course of decades to change the opinion regarding the slave trade.59 Indeed, 
in some of its earliest attempts to interdict slave-trading ships and claim jurisdiction over 
them, Great Britain ran into resistance not only from other nations, but from British 
courts as well. In the Le Louis matter, regarding the seizure by Great Britain of a French 
ship engaged in the slave trade, Sir William Scott’s opinion for the High Court of Admi-
ralty indicates that the right of interdiction was limited to war time, and in peace, no na-
tion may abrogate the sovereignty of another by seizing its vessels. 
 
[A]ll nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted 
use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In 
places where no local authority exists, where the subjects of all states 
meet upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no one state, 
                                                          
 52. Additional Convention to the Treaty of 22 January 1815 Between His Britannic Majesty and His Most 
Faithful Majesty, for the Purpose of Preventing Their Subjects from Engaging in Any Illicit Traffic in Slaves 
art. 5, Gr. Brit.- Port., July 28, 1817, 4 B.S.P. 85. 
 53. Byers, Policing, supra note 51, at 535.   
 54. Id. at 536. 
 55. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 113 (noting that with crimes similar to the slave trade, such as human traf-
ficking, universal jurisdiction is more prevalent in treaties which equate trafficking to piracy).   
 56. LEWIS CASS, AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS NOW IN DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF SEARCH (1842) (presented to the French government as a 
formal memorandum when Cass was the minister to France). 
 57. Byers, Policing, supra note 51, at 536. 
 58. Randall, supra note 3, at 800. 
 59. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 106-07 (1999). 
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or any of its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority over 
the subjects of another.60 
 
Today, the international legal prohibition against the slave trade and slavery is 
clear.61 However, when Great Britain began the work of expanding jurisdiction over the 
slave trade to allow the exercise of universal jurisdiction, there was not yet an interna-
tional consensus to support this position. Great Britain instead sought to create the cus-
tomary international law norm outlawing the slave trade at the same time as it was ex-
panding the definition of piracy to include the slave trade and allow for universal 
jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction saw its next great expansion in the wake of World War II 
when it was posited as one—but neither the sole, nor the principle—possible basis for 
jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals.62 
2. War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace, and Crimes Against Humanity 
a. The International Military Tribunal 
The need for extraterritorial jurisdiction and the difficulties in applying it were 
readily apparent in the aftermath of World War II. While the laws of war had been rec-
ognized “by civilized nations” for hundreds of years63 and had been codified in treaties 
since the nineteenth century,64 there was little in terms of useful precedents for prosecu-
tion that did not smack of “victor’s justice.”65 
                                                          
 60. Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1476 (High Ct. of Adm. 1817). 
 61. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 254 
[hereinafter Slavery Convention]; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 6, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 62. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 37-57 (2000). There were attempts at war crimes tribunals after the defeat of Napoleon and in the 
wake of World War I. The idea of bringing charges against Napoleon was quickly abandoned, due in part to the 
weakness of the French Crown and the fact that only the British were truly interested in trying him. The Allies 
considered war crimes trials at the end of World War I as well. It is worth noting, however, that Belgium, 
France, and Italy suggested only prosecutions against individuals held responsible for crimes against their own 
people. See id. at 58-105. Having not occupied Germany, however, and being unable to acquire custody over 
the defendants, the Allies conceded to allowing Germany to try the defendants. These trials at Leipzig, which 
resulted mainly in acquittals and a few light sentences, were roundly denounced by the Allies as a farce, and by 
the Germans as an outrage. See id. Great Britain sought to bring charges against Ottoman officers and officials, 
not just for the mistreatment of British prisoners of war, but also for the mass murder of the Armenians. A 
Turkish court martial in Constantinople convened, but eventually collapsed in the face of a nationalist uprising. 
See id. at 106-46. In the aftermath of both the Napoleonic wars and World War I, the desire to hold trials was 
closely tied to the victorious States’ status as victims of the conduct charged, which fits within the passive per-
sonality theory of jurisdiction. Only the British attempt to try Ottoman officials for the Armenian mass murder 
would belong in the category of universal jurisdiction and this experiment was largely a failure. 
 63. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [The Law of War and Peace] (1625).  
 64. War Dep’t, Adjunct Gen.’s Office, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, Gen. Orders No. 100 (Lieber Code) (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S 
CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR (1983); Declaration of St. Petersburg, November 29, 1868, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 
(Supp. 1907); Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803; Hague Convention (IV) Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839; Hague Convention (II) Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the 
Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. 
 65. The concern regarding victors’ justice is clear in Justice Robert Jackson’s opening statement to the tri-
bunal: 
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Until early 1945, it was not even clear that the Allies intended to pursue justice in 
earnest. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was of the opinion that the most prom-
inent war criminals should be summarily executed upon capture and identification.66 
This opinion was shared by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who suggested 
this course of action to President Franklin Roosevelt in late 1944. Secretary of War Hen-
ry Stimson, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, and Attorney General Francis Biddle 
presented the idea of bringing the leading war criminals to trial to Roosevelt, in the form 
of the “Yalta Memorandum” in early 1945.67 This memorandum laid out the arguments 
in favor of a full international tribunal under the authority of the United Nations. The au-
thors of the memorandum stated: 
 
We think that the just and effective solution lies in the use of the judi-
cial method. Condemnation of these criminals after a trial, moreover, 
Would [sic] command maximum public support in our own times and 
receive the respect of history. The use of the judicial method will, in 
addition, make available for all mankind to study in future years an au-
thentic record of Nazi crimes and criminality.68 
 
Although the Yalta Memorandum approach gained the approval of Roosevelt, it 
would still be months before the other Allies agreed to take part in a tribunal. In the 
spring of 1945, as the war in Europe was ending, Justice Robert Jackson of the U.S. Su-
preme Court was sent to meet with Lord Chancellor John Simon, Foreign Secretary An-
thony Eden, and Attorney General David Maxwell-Fyfe to obtain Great Britain’s assent 
to a judicial proceeding. On June 3, 1945, the British Ambassador to the U.S. informed 
the State Department that Great Britain had accepted in principle the American plan for a 
judicial proceeding.69 Negotiations to determine the structure of the court, its jurisdic-
tion, and the governing law began on June 26, 1945, and ended with the August 8, 1945 
London Agreement, establishing the International Military Tribunal.70 
Even after having decided to pursue justice instead of vengeance, the Allies found 
themselves trying to punish the military leaders of a sovereign nation for actions that 
were not illegal under that country’s law. For crimes committed by defendants in the ter-
ritory of one of the victors or a liberated State, that country would have had jurisdiction 
over the crime under the territoriality principle. Also, the victors, having sovereign au-
thority over the territory of Germany, arguably had the same authority that a German 
                                                                                                                                               
Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution and judgment must 
be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The worldwide scope of the aggressions car-
ried out by these men has left but few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the van-
quished or we must leave the defeated to judge themselves.  
Transcript of Record at 100, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings vol. 2 (1945).  
 66. See Whitney R. Harris, Justice Jackson at Nuremberg, 20 INT’L LAWYER 867 (1986). 
 67. Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General 
(Jan. 22, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack01.asp. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Harris, supra note 66. 
 70. See id. 
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government would have had over its defendants for their actions during the war.71 It was 
under this conception of jurisdiction that the Allies effectuated Control Council Law No. 
10, defining the crimes that would be within the IMT’s jurisdiction and the authority of 
the occupying powers within their zones in Germany.72 Such prosecutions, however, 
could suggest an ex post facto application of criminal law and a violation of the historic 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege.73 There were certainly charges brought against de-
fendants whose actions were not illegal under German law at the time the acts were 
committed. In order to have jurisdiction over such charges, the IMT Charter relied upon 
longstanding international legal obligations which override domestic law.74 
The IMT Charter defined three categories of crimes over which the tribunal had 
subject matter jurisdiction: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humani-
ty. Crimes against peace included planning and waging wars of aggression in violation of 
international agreements.75 War crimes related to the conduct of forces in prosecuting the 
war, and included: 
 
[M]urder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other 
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.76 
 
Crimes against humanity were defined as “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war; or persecutions . . . in connection with any crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.”77 
It is worth noting that crimes against humanity only fell within the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal when committed in connection with crimes of aggression or war crimes. Un-
like crimes against peace and war crimes, crimes against humanity were not defined and 
prohibited in any treaties or conventions. Prior attempts to invoke the legal concept of 
crimes against humanity, most prominently in the wake of World War I, had been aban-
                                                          
 71. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 91. 
 72. Control Council Law No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp. 
 73. The principle of nullem crimen sine lege, or “no crime without law,” is an international legal principle 
analogous to the concept of the prohibition on ex post facto laws. Nullem crimen sine lege requires that conduct 
be criminal at the time it occurred in order to be punishable.   
 74. The preamble of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal makes reference to the 1943 Moscow 
Declaration, which indicated that individuals who were responsible for or consented to atrocities and crimes in 
occupied Europe would be sent back to those countries in which their crimes were committed to be judged and 
punished according to the laws of the liberated countries. The IMT, on the other hand, was designed to hear the 
cases of those major criminals whose offenses had no particular geographic location. Those criminals who 
could stand trial under a regime based on the territoriality principle, would face justice where their crimes had 
taken place. In the case of the highest ranking offenders, their crimes were often committed in Germany or 
across the theater of war. It was these individuals who found themselves subjected to extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.   
 75. IMT Charter, supra note 27, at art. 6(a)-(c). 
 76. Id. at art. 6(b). 
 77. Id. at art. 6(c). 
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doned.78 For these reasons, the Allies moved forward cautiously with respect to crimes 
against humanity. Later developments in international criminal law would sever the link 
between crimes against humanity and war crimes or crimes of aggression. 
Prosecution of defendants for crimes of aggression and war crimes were based up-
on the treaties and conventions to which Germany itself was a party, namely the 1907 
Hague Conventions on the Laws of War and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.79 Unlike the much 
later Hostage Convention and the Hijacking Convention however, these conventions did 
not call for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Nor did they define requirements for prosecution 
or extradition. Prosecutions for these crimes, therefore, could not be justified by explicit 
treaty terms which granted the Allies jurisdiction. In those instances in which crimes 
took place within the territory of one of the Allies, the territoriality principle provided 
ample basis for jurisdiction. The Allies de facto sovereignty over occupied Germany cre-
ated territorial jurisdiction for those crimes committed within Germany. In a limited 
number of cases under the Zonal tribunals—as opposed to the IMT, which was limited to 
prosecuting the highest ranking criminals—prosecution was justified in part by reference 
to universal jurisdiction.80 
In rendering its judgment, the IMT addressed the issues of State immunity and jus-
ticiability, and rejected the defense that the defendants were immune from prosecution 
because they were acting as agents of the State and their behavior was not illegal under 
German law at that time. 
The principle of international law which, under certain circumstances, protects the 
representatives of a State, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by 
international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their offi-
cial position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.81 
With respect to arguments that the accused should not face charges based on con-
duct which was not illegal under German law, the Allied Powers looked toward fair no-
tice considerations, instead of an inflexible application of nullum crimen sine lege. In-
deed, the IMT held that “the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of 
sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.”82 The Tribunal further noted that the 
crimes that the defendants were accused of were violations of Germany’s treaty obliga-
tions and that the defendants knew their conduct was “wrong” even if it was not illegal 
under German domestic law.83 
In dispensing with both the State immunity arguments and the arguments against 
application of international criminal law which conflicted with domestic law in a single 
paragraph, the Tribunal held: 
 
                                                          
 78. BASS, supra note 62, at 106-46.   
 79. Hague Convention (IV) Laws and Customs of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 3 Stat. 2277; General Treaty for Re-
nunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57. 
 80. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 3, at 804-10 (providing a summary of references to universal jurisdiction 
by the IMT and the various Zonal tribunals).   
 81. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg Trial Proceed-
ings vol. 22, Two Hundred and Seventeenth Day (Sept. 30, 1946), at 465 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 461. 
 83. Id. 
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Occupying the positions they did in the Government of Germany, the 
defendants, or at least some of them, must have known of the treaties 
signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of in-
ternational disputes; they must have known that they were acting in de-
fiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they car-
ried out their designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the 
case alone, it would appear that the maxim [nullum crimen sine lege] 
has no application to the present facts.84 
 
The decisions of the Tribunal thus rested on a finding that the defendants knew that 
their conduct was proscribed by international law, even though it was legal under domes-
tic law. The defendants’ knowledge of the wrongfulness of their conduct—that it had 
been condemned and outlawed in treaties to which Germany was a party, and it was con-
demned among civilized nations—meant there was no conflict between the prohibition 
on ex post facto laws and the prosecutions at Nuremberg.85 
The IMT itself did not need to invoke universal jurisdiction in order to try the de-
fendants. The IMT nonetheless stands as a watershed moment for the advancement of the 
concept of universal jurisdiction. The Nuremberg Principles, espoused by the IMT and 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, formed the cornerstone of internation-
al human rights law, declaring that anyone who violates international law is subject to 
punishment, and that one’s status as a State actor neither absolves one of illegal conduct, 
nor immunizes one from prosecution.86 The IMT’s justifications for allowing prosecu-
tions to proceed despite the defendants’ arguments regarding nullum crimen sine lege 
have also become important international legal principles.87 Later domestic courts and 
international tribunals would look to the example of the IMT in justifying jurisdiction 
over war crimes and crimes against humanity.88 
b. The Adolf Eichmann Prosecution 
One of the most celebrated cases following the precedent set by the IMT was the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann, “the architect of the Holocaust.” Eichmann, a kidnapping victim 
of Israeli Mossad agents from Argentina in 1960,89 had been living in Argentina under a 
false identity since 1950, having escaped Europe and prosecution by the Allies.90 
After the Anschluss of Austria by Germany, Eichmann had been tasked with run-
ning the Center for Emigration of Austrian Jews, an institution charged with forcibly ex-
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. See Ariel Zemach, Fairness and Moral Judgments in International Criminal Law: The Settlement Pro-
vision in the Rome Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 895, 903 (2003). 
 86. The Nuremberg Principles were adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in G.A. Res. 177 (1950). See 
Int’l Law Comm’n, 2d Session, Principles of International Law of the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, 4 INT’L ORG. 714, 717-19 (1950) (Nuremberg Principles VI). 
 87. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 21 (1963). 
 88. See, e.g., ICTR, supra note 29; ICTY, supra note 29; and Rome Statute, supra note 29; Justice, U.N. 
Charter arts. 2-70 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
 89. ARENDT, supra note 87, at 238-39. 
 90. Id. at 236-37. 
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pelling Jews from Austria.91 When the Third Reich’s goal transformed from expulsion to 
annihilation, Eichmann, then a lieutenant colonel in the Schutzstaffel, or SS, was given 
the position of Transportation Administrator of the “Final Solution.”92 As Hannah Ar-
endt chronicled in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Eichmann 
was a technocrat, looking to please his superiors. He claimed he bore no responsibility 
for his role in the Holocaust because he was simply doing his duty—obeying the law as 
it existed in Nazi Germany.93 
Eichmann faced a fifteen-count criminal indictment which included crimes against 
the Jewish people, namely causing the deaths of millions of Jews through his implemen-
tation of “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question;” enslavement; deportation under 
inhuman conditions; starvation; expulsion; persecution; mass arrests of innocent people 
without judicial process; torture; infliction of serious injury; “stigmatizing them [Jews] 
as a subhuman racial group;” forced abortion; sterilization; forced robbery; as well as 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined by international law.94 
Israel claimed the right to try Eichmann on the grounds of passive personality ju-
risdiction, protective principle jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction. Israel’s national 
legislation conferring upon its courts jurisdiction over “[c]rimes against the Jewish peo-
ple,” was passed in 1950, but applied to any such substantive crimes, whenever and 
wherever they occurred.95 As Professor Bassiouni points out, “Israel’s jurisdictional 
reach is, under its law, universal, but it is based on a nationality connection to the victim 
that places such jurisdictional basis [of prosecution] under the ‘passive personality’ theo-
ry.”96 Some scholars have challenged this assertion, questioning whether Israel had the 
ability to exercise passive personality jurisdiction or protective principle jurisdiction over 
Eichmann because his crimes occurred before Israel became a State in 1948.97 But the 
district court’s ruling on this point is clear: 
 
The State of Israel, the sovereign State of the Jewish people, performs 
through its legislation the task of carrying into effect the right of the 
Jewish people to punish the criminals who killed its sons with intent to 
put an end to the survival of this people. We are convinced that this 
power conforms to the subsisting principles of nations.98 
 
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld jurisdic-
tion on the passive personality theory, “fully agree[ing] with every word said by the [Is-
raeli District] Court” on the proper application of the passive personality and protective 
principle theories of jurisdiction.99 The Israeli Supreme Court soundly rejected Eich-
                                                          
 91. Id. at 42-44. 
 92. Id. at 112-14, 152-53, 157-61. 
 93. Id. at 21-22, 135-38. 
 94.  Att’y Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961). 
 95. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950, 4 L.S.I. 154 (1950) (Isr.). 
 96. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 137. 
 97. But see Randall, supra note 3, at 814. 
 98. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 57.  
 99. Transcript of Record at Session 7 (part 5 of 9), Eichmann v. Att’y Gen. of Isr., 17 PD 2033 (1962) 
(CrimA 366/61).  
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mann’s appeal that the retroactive application of the 1950 law to a period before Israel’s 
existence was improper.100 However, the court also stated that jurisdiction was proper 
under a theory of universal jurisdiction, analogizing crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide to the crime of piracy, which was recognized as a crime of univer-
sal jurisdiction under customary international law.101 The Israeli Supreme Court stated 
the importance of relying on universal jurisdiction in trying Eichmann: it gave Israel the 
right to try Eichmann not only for his crimes against the Jews, but also for those commit-
ted against Poles, Slavs, Gypsies, and other victims of the Holocaust.102 The Israeli Su-
preme Court held that: “[t]he State of Israel . . .was entitled, pursuant to the principle of 
universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent 
for its enforcement, to try the Appellant.”103 
The Israeli Supreme Court drew upon reasoning from the IMT, as well as the pira-
cy analogy, in justifying the exercise of jurisdiction over Eichmann, and deconstructing 
arguments regarding act of State immunity and nullum crimen sine lege. Although there 
are compelling arguments that Israel would have had jurisdiction over Eichmann under 
the protective principle and the passive personality theory of jurisdiction,104 the case re-
mains one of the most salient arguments in favor of universal jurisdiction for crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.105 
c. The Geneva Conventions 
The emerging consensus in the wake of World War II made it clear that crimes 
against humanity and war crimes were violations of international law, which exposed 
perpetrators to international justice. The IMT, however, was an ad hoc entity and could 
provide only so much guidance for how war crimes and crimes against humanity should 
be deterred and punished in the future. Without a permanent international criminal court, 
it was not entirely clear whether future prosecutions would be left to domestic courts.106 
While it was a number of years before real progress was made on the issue of interna-
tional criminal tribunals, the post-war era saw a continuation of a trend in the creation of 
treaties which purported to codify or develop existing principles of customary interna-
tional law.107 
Among the most prominent of these treaties relating to customary international law 
                                                          
 100. Id. at part 1. 
 101. Id. at part 3.  
 102. Id. at part 5. 
 103. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 304. 
 104. While the purpose of this article lies not in any analysis of poetic justice, it seems fitting that Eichmann 
was tried by an Israeli court, given his outsized role in stripping Jews of their citizenship in European states, 
and preventing any state from exercising passive personality jurisdiction on their behalf. C.f. ARENDT, supra 
note 87, at 115.  
 105. Germany would have been well within its rights to request that Eichmann be extradited to Germany to 
face trial there under the territorial principle of jurisdiction. However, neither the Adenauer government, nor 
any significant portion of the German public sought Eichmann’s extradition from Israel. See ARENDT, supra 
note 87, at 17.  
 106. See Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277. 
 107. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in 
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 464 (1985); Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers’ 
View, 33 VA. J. INT’L. L. 275, 289-90 (1993); Louis B. Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, 61 
WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074-76 (1986). 
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are the four Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions, drafted in 1949, provided 
the most thorough and comprehensive statement about the proper treatment of the 
wounded, prisoners of war, and civilians in international armed conflicts.108 Grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions overlap substantially with the definitions of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in the IMT Charter,109 and certain parts of the Gene-
va Conventions have long been recognized as merely codifying customary international 
law.110 Today, more States are parties to the Geneva Conventions than the United Na-
tions Charter.111 
Unlike earlier treaties on humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions delineate ex-
plicit responsibilities for States’ parties in terms of suppressing and punishing certain vi-
olations.112 A party to the Geneva Conventions is under an obligation to search for per-
sons alleged to have committed grave breaches and bring such persons, regardless of 
their nationality, before its own courts or extradite them to another State party that has 
made out a prima facie case for the violation.113 While customary international law re-
garding war crimes and crimes against humanity permits the exercise of universal juris-
diction, the Geneva Conventions in fact require the exercise of such jurisdiction when 
the perpetrator is on the soil of a State party. This form of obligatory jurisdiction, as op-
posed to permissive jurisdiction, seen in the examples of piracy and the slave trade, 
would also be incorporated into later treaties concerning international criminal law.114 
3.  Genocide, Torture, and Apartheid 
Another critical development in the post-war era involved not the codification of 
existing customary international law, but the simultaneous creation of an international 
jus cogens norm and a treaty codifying that norm. Genocide, torture, and apartheid are 
all examples of crimes whose international legal evolution included the concurrent de-
velopment of jus cogens norms and conventional law. 
a. The Genocide Convention 
Prior to 1946, genocide was a crime without a name and without any formal 
recognition under international law.115 Genocide was prosecuted by the IMT, but not as 
such. Defendants were charged with the customary international law crime of crimes 
                                                          
 108. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, [herein-
after Geneva Convention for Wounded, Sick, Shipwrecked]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S., 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  
 109. Compare Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 108, at art. 50, with IMT Charter, supra note 27. 
 110. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 364-65 (1987).  
 111. Id. at 348. 
 112. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, supra note 108, at art. 49-51. 
 113. Id. at art. 49. 
 114. See generally Geneva Conventions, supra note 108.  
 115. For more information regarding efforts to define and outlaw genocide, particularly those of Raphael 
Lemkin, see SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2003). 
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against humanity, which included the mass murder of civilians. But there was no distinc-
tion made between mass murder and the systematic attempt to annihilate a national, ra-
cial, religious, or ethnic group.116 The same day that the United Nations General Assem-
bly affirmed the judgment of the IMT, it also passed another resolution declaring 
genocide to be an international crime and delegating to the Economic and Social Council 
the task of drafting a convention on genocide.117 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(“Genocide Convention”) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in De-
cember 1948, and entered into force in 1951.118 The Genocide Convention defines geno-
cide as attempting “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such,” through murder, serious bodily harm, forcibly preventing births within 
the group, or “forcibly transferring the children of the group to another group.”119 
International law scholars widely agree that genocide is a crime subject to univer-
sal jurisdiction.120 However, the Genocide Convention actually requires that perpetrators 
“be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was com-
mitted, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to 
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”121 Some have ar-
gued that this prescription of the Genocide Convention is merely advisory, since geno-
cide remains a crime subject to universal jurisdiction under customary international 
law.122 Nonetheless, the Genocide Convention’s use of the word “shall,” a construction 
understood to be obligatory, has created confusion with respect to this issue.123 
The adoption of the treaties to address jus cogens international crimes has had a 
mixed impact on the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
The Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention have been extremely useful in 
clarifying and defining the behavior that is proscribed. These definitions have been relied 
upon by the charters of international criminal tribunals which will be discussed infra,124 
and they put to rest any arguments against universal jurisdiction on the grounds of nul-
lum crimen sine lege.125 However, while the Geneva Conventions have broadened the 
potential application of universal jurisdiction over war criminals by making their prose-
cution obligatory on States parties (as opposed to voluntary), the Genocide Convention 
has confused the issue of who has the authority to prosecute. While it is uniformly ac-
cepted by leading scholars of international law that genocide is subject to permissive 
universal jurisdiction,126 “there is no state practice to support [this] argument.”127 Geno-
                                                          
 116. IMT Charter, supra note 27, at art. 6(c) (defining crimes against humanity). 
 117. Gen. Assembly Res. 95 (1) at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64 (Dec. 11, 1946).  
 118. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 119. Id. at art. 2. 
 120. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 8. 
 121. Genocide Convention, supra note 118, at art. 6. 
 122. See Randall, supra note 3, at 835-36. 
 123. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 121. 
 124. See ICTY, supra note 29; see also ICTR, supra note 29; ICC Statute, supra note 88.  
 125. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 554, 566 
(1995). 
 126. See id. at 569. 
 127. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 121. 
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cide is defined as a crime subject to universal jurisdiction in the Restatement of Foreign 
Relations128 because of the influence of scholars of international law, not based on the 
practice of national courts or any treaty explicitly creating such jurisdiction.129 
b. The Torture Convention130 
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture”) was drafted under the purview of 
the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1984, and entered into force in June 1987, 
upon the ratification of twenty States’ parties.131 The text of the Convention Against Tor-
ture refers to the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which both state that “no one shall be subjected to torture.”132 
For purposes of the Convention Against Torture, torture is defined to include actions “in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity” and the Convention targets public, not pri-
vate conduct.133 The Convention Against Torture requires States’ parties to take effective 
measures to prevent “torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” and states that “[n]o 
exceptional circumstance whatsoever . . . may be invoked as a justification of torture.”134 
It also contains a mandatory “try or extradite” provision, requiring a State to establish 
jurisdiction over alleged offenders when the offense is committed within the territory 
under that State’s jurisdiction, or aboard “a ship or aircraft registered in that State,” or 
“[w]hen the alleged offender is a national of that State,” and permitting the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the State’s discretion where the “victim is a national of that State.”135 
States are also required to establish jurisdiction over any offense where the alleged of-
fender is in the territory of the State and the State does not extradite him or her.136 
c. The Apartheid Convention 
Historically, apartheid—the official racially discriminatory policy of South Africa 
that was in place until 1994—has been denounced by the United Nations General As-
sembly in annual resolutions dating back to the 1950s.137 These resolutions condemned 
apartheid as inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and one of the critical purposes of the 
                                                          
 128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 33, at § 404. 
 129. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 121; see also supra notes 188-227 and accompanying text. 
 130. Torture had been previously deemed a violation of universal human rights in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as series of U.N. resolu-
tions, but none of these documents provided for any international criminal enforcement mechanism. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71, art. 5 (1948); International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights (U.N.T.S. vol. 999, I-14668), art. 7 (1976). 
 131. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
 132. Id. at pmbl. See also U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 130; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 130. 
 133. Convention Against Torture, supra note 131, at art. 1. 
 134. Id. at art. 2. 
 135. Id. at art. 5(1)(a)–(c). 
 136. Id. at art. 5(2). 
 137. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 616 (VII), Dec. 5, 1952; G.A. Res. 917 (X), Dec. 6, 1955; G.A. Res. 1248 (XIII) 
Oct. 30, 1958; G.A. Res. 1761, Nov. 6, 1962; G.A. Res. 2307 (XXII), Dec. 13, 1967. 
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss1/2
KAZEMI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013  7:32 PM 
2013] JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 19 
United Nations—to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all.138 General Assembly Resolution 1761, adopted in November 1962, 
called upon U.N. Member States to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa; 
“[c]los[e] their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag;” end trade with South 
Africa, trade in arms and ammunition; and deny landing and passage facilities to aircraft 
owned by the South African government or registered to a South African company.139 
The resolution also established a special committee to review South Africa’s racial poli-
cies.140 A 1966 General Assembly resolution denounced apartheid as a crime against 
humanity.141 Beginning in 1960, the Security Council also began regularly denouncing 
apartheid and calling it a potential threat to international peace and security.142 
In 1973, The General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Sup-
pression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (“Apartheid Convention”).143 The 
Convention declared apartheid to be a crime against humanity144 and defined apartheid 
as “practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa . . . 
committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial 
group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing 
them.”145 Article IV of the Apartheid Convention states that: 
 
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake: (a) [t]o adopt 
any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to 
prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segre-
gationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of 
that crime; (b) [t]o adopt legislative, judicial and administrative 
measures to prosecute, bring to trial and punish in accordance with 
their jurisdiction persons responsible for, or accused of, the acts defined 
in article II of the present Convention, whether or not such persons re-
side in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or are 
nationals of that State or of some other State or are stateless persons.146 
 
Article V states that persons charged with offenses under the Apartheid Conven-
tion “may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which 
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused or by an international penal tri-
bunal having jurisdiction.”147 Articles IV and V create permissive universal jurisdiction–
allowing any State party to try an alleged offender for the crime of apartheid, regardless 
of where the crime occurred. 
                                                          
 138. Id. 
 139. G.A. Res. 1761 (XVII), at 9. 
 140. Id. at 9-10. 
 141. G.A. Res. 2144 (XXI), at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6467 (Oct. 26, 1966). 
 142. S.C. Res. 134, U.N. Doc. S/RES/134 (Apr. 1, 1960). 
 143. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, July 18, 1976, 
1015 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]. 
 144. Id. at pmbl. 
 145. Id. at art. 2.  
 146. Id. at art. 4. 
 147. Id. at art. 5. 
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The General Assembly passed the Apartheid Convention by a vote of ninety-one in 
favor to four against (Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States), with twenty-six abstentions. Clearly, at the time the resolution was passed, there 
was not worldwide consensus sufficient to make the crime of apartheid a jus cogens of-
fense. Since that time, universal condemnation of apartheid has grown even stronger, to 
the point where the crime as official State policy no longer exists. With the demise of 
apartheid in South Africa, there have been no domestic or international prosecutions for 
apartheid under this treaty. The status of apartheid as a jus cogens crime subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction is accepted by many international legal scholars,148 but there is no 
State practice to point to on this issue. That the prohibition on apartheid is a jus cogens 
norm of international law may be best supported by the fact that at the level of States, it 
is now extinct. 
B. Explicit Treaty-Based Jurisdiction 
While scholars agree that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is “generally re-
served for the most serious international crimes,” a number of additional crimes which 
are not jus cogens crimes have become the subject of universal jurisdiction by way of 
treaty.149 These include aircraft hijacking, hostage taking, and various acts of terrorism. 
1.  Aircraft Hijacking 
The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hi-
jacking Convention”) defined hijacking as an international crime and established a series 
of guidelines as to how it should be prosecuted.150 The Hijacking Convention applies to 
all international flights and requires States’ parties to take the necessary measures to es-
tablish jurisdiction over a hijacking when: (a) the aircraft in question is registered in that 
State; (b) the aircraft lands in the territory of the State with the alleged offender still on 
board; (c) the aircraft is leased to a lessee with his principal place of business or perma-
nent residence in the State; or (d) the alleged offender is present in the State’s territo-
ry.151 The States’ parties are then required to take alleged offenders “into custody or take 
other measures” to secure their presence until criminal or extradition proceedings can be 
implemented.152 If the State party chooses not to extradite the offender, it is “obliged, 
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its terri-
tory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”153 
This principle of “try or extradite” also known as aut dedere aut judicare appears in nu-
merous treaties and conventions and has become a very common approach to the appli-
cation of treaty-based universal jurisdiction.154 
The Hijacking Convention permits universal jurisdiction over the crime of hijack-
                                                          
 148. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 108.  
 149. Id. at 82, 108. 
 150. Hijacking Convention, supra note 13. 
 151. Id. at art. 4. 
 152. Id. at art. 6.  
 153. Id. at art. 7. 
 154. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 103. 
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ing and in fact, requires States’ parties to either exercise jurisdiction or extradite the of-
fender to a State that will exercise jurisdiction. The acceptance of the Hijacking Conven-
tion and its requirements was seen as a necessary step by the States parties, given the 
failure of its predecessor, the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed On Board Aircraft (“Tokyo Convention”), to prevent hijackings.155 The To-
kyo Convention did not define or create particular offenses, nor did it require parties to 
prohibit or punish hijacking.156 It merely required States’ parties to take all appropriate 
measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or preserve his or her 
control of the aircraft, to permit passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as 
practicable, and to return the aircraft and its cargo.157 
The provisions of the Tokyo Convention proved insufficient to prevent further hi-
jackings. Indeed, the number of hijackings rose dramatically, with over 120 hijackings in 
1968 and 1969—more than double the number of hijackings in the prior two decades 
combined.158 The International Civil Aviation Organization convened at the Hague in 
December of 1970 to draft the more robust Hijacking Convention, which, as stated 
above, requires prosecution or extradition.159 The total number of yearly hijackings de-
clined after 1970, though a substantial portion of this decrease is likely due to the signing 
of the 1973 U.S.-Cuba Memorandum of Understanding to prosecute hijackers.160 Prior to 
that agreement, a large number of hijackings were linked to Cubans seeking safe haven 
in the United States or seeking to return to Cuba.161 Nonetheless, the Hijacking Conven-
tion acts as a deterrent to hijackings because prosecution or extradition are now mandato-
ry, leaving fewer States as potential safe havens for hijackers.162 Of course, this deterrent 
has no value when the hijackers have no intention of surviving the hijacking, as was the 
case in the acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001. 
2. Hostage-Taking 
The 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages creates and de-
fines hostage-taking as an international crime.163 It calls on States’ parties to make hos-
tage-taking a domestic offense and to establish appropriate penalties.164 A State party is 
obliged to take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over the offense of hostage-
taking when: (a) it occurs within its territory, or on board a ship or aircraft registered to 
the State; (b) its nationals or residents engage in hostage-taking; (c) the State is the target 
of pressure from the hostage-takers; (d) its nationals are the victims of hostage-taking; or 
                                                          
 155. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, Dec. 4, 1969, 704 
U.N.T.S. 219.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at art. 11(2). 
 158. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism, 41 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 649, 654 (2003).   
 159. See id. at 666-67. 
 160. See Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses, Feb. 15, 1973, U.S.-Cuba, 24 U.S.T. 737, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7579. 
 161. See Dempsey, supra note 158, at 653. 
 162. See id. at 668. 
 163. Hostage Convention, supra note 13. 
 164. Id. 
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(e) the alleged offenders are present in the State’s territory.165 The Hostage Convention 
contains the same language as the Hijacking Convention with respect to the requirement 
that States’ parties must extradite or prosecute alleged offenders “without exception 
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory. . . .”166 
3. Terrorism 
A series of conventions on terrorism were adopted between 1997 and 2005 to ad-
dress terrorist bombings, terrorism financing, and the risk of nuclear terrorism. These 
piecemeal treaties came about in part because there is, as yet, no well-accepted interna-
tional definition of terrorism, and as such, no omnibus anti-terrorism treaty.167 While the 
issue of who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter remains the subject of interna-
tional political debate,168 there was sufficient consensus on particular acts of terrorism to 
allow for the adoption of treaties relating to bombings, terrorism financing, and nuclear 
terrorism. 
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (“Bomb-
ing Convention”) proscribes the delivery, placement, or detonation of an explosive or 
other lethal device against a public or government facility with the intent to cause death, 
bodily injury, or extensive destruction.169 The International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism (“Terrorism Financing Convention”)170 defines the 
crime of terrorism financing as “directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully” provid-
ing or collecting funds “with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge 
that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” acts prohibited by any of 
the other U.N. anti-terrorism conventions (including hostage-taking, hijacking, bombing, 
unlawful assaults on vessels at sea, or attacks on internationally protected persons).171 
The Terrorism Financing Convention also proscribes the financing of: 
 
[A]ct[s] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situa-
tion of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or in-
ternational organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.172 
 
The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror-
                                                          
 165. Id. at art. 5. 
 166. Id. at art. 8. 
 167. Thalif Deen, U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism, INTER PRESS SERVICE (July 25, 2005), 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29633. 
 168. See, e.g., Organization of the Islamic Conference Convention on Combating International Terrorism, 
art. 2, July 1, 1999. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference has specifically excluded from its definition of 
terrorism “armed struggle against foreign occupation.”   
 169. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/52/164 [hereinafter Bombings Convention].  
 170. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/54/109 [hereinafter Financing Terrorism Convention].   
 171. Id. art. 2(1)(a) and Annex. 
 172. Id. at art. 2(b). 
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ism (“Nuclear Terrorism Convention”) criminalizes under international law the posses-
sion of radioactive material with intent to cause death, injury, or property damage.173 It 
does not address the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States.174 
All three conventions apply to acts that are not wholly domestic. For example, the 
perpetrator, situs, and victims are all of the same nationality, the offender is found in the 
State in which the crime was committed, and no other State has a traditional basis for ex-
ercising jurisdiction.175 All three conventions also require a State party to exercise juris-
diction over terrorist bombings where it has territorial jurisdiction (the act took place 
within the State or onboard vessels registered in the State), or active personality jurisdic-
tion (the perpetrator is a national of the State).176 States may exercise jurisdiction based 
on passive personality or protective principle jurisdiction, or when the perpetrator is pre-
sent in its territory.177 As with the previous conventions discussed in this section, all 
three conventions require a State party to extradite or try an alleged perpetrator of a pro-
scribed act “without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was commit-
ted in its territory.”178 
Since the end of World War II, there has been substantial growth and development 
of treaty-based universal jurisdiction. The evolution of this field differs from that of cus-
tomary international law-based universal jurisdiction since it relies on neither longstand-
ing State practice or evidence of universal condemnation.179 Instead, States have actively 
chosen to create universal jurisdiction through their assent to relevant treaties, even in 
the absence of customary international law norms. 
C. Post-War International Criminal Tribunals 
Yet another area of development in jurisdiction over internationally recognized 
crimes lies in the expansion of fora to hear such cases. Since the end of the Cold War, 
several international criminal tribunals have convened. The most prominent are the Tri-
bunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The 
first two courts have their subject matter jurisdiction geographically and temporally lim-
ited to the war resulting in the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Rwandan genocide, respectively.180 Both courts have jurisdiction over war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.181 The ICC, on the other hand, is not an ad hoc 
tribunal, but a standing court with treaty-based jurisdiction over the same three jus co-
gens crimes when committed within its Member States: war crimes, crimes against hu-
                                                          
 173. Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 30, at art. 2. 
 174. Id. at art. 4. 
 175. Financing Terrorism Convention, supra note 170, at art. 3; Bombings Convention, supra note 169, at 
art. 3; Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 30, at art. 3.  
 176. Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 30, at art. 9(1); Financing Terrorism Convention, supra note 
170, at art. 7(1); Bombings Convention, supra note 169, at art 6(1). 
 177. Financing Terrorism Convention, supra note 170, at art. 7(2), 7(3); Bombings Convention, supra note 
169, at art. 6(2), 6(3); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 30, at art. 9(2), 9(3). 
 178. Financing Terrorism Convention, supra note 170, at art. 10; Bombings Convention, supra note 169, at 
art. 8; Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 30, at art. 11. 
 179. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 125. 
 180. ICTR, supra note 29, at art. 1; ICTY, supra note 29, at art. 1. 
 181. ICTR, supra note 29, at arts. 2-4; ICTY, supra note 29, at arts. 3-5. 
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manity, and genocide.182 The ICC will eventually also have jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, once Member States have agreed to the definition of the offense.183 
Unlike the IMT, these modern tribunals are wholly international entities and are 
not the direct representatives of their constituent Member States.184 For example, a Bra-
zilian prosecutor or Italian judge on these courts would not report to or represent the in-
terest of their home country for purposes of discharging their duties.185 The courts cannot 
claim jurisdiction under the passive personality principle, because they do not directly 
represent victim States. They cannot claim territorial jurisdiction because they do not 
represent victorious States exercising control over a defeated enemy. 
The extraterritorial jurisdiction practiced by these entities also cannot be consid-
ered universal jurisdiction because it is not based upon the theory that all States have the 
right to try defendants accused of particular crimes. Indeed, the Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) exercise primacy of jurisdiction over national courts.186 
The U.N. Security Council has required U.N. Member States to cooperate fully with the 
Tribunals. Article 28 of the ICTR and Article 29 of the ICTY Statutes obligate States to 
“comply without undue delay” to any request for assistance or Trial Chamber Order that 
relates to the identification and location of individuals, the taking of testimony and pro-
duction of evidence, the arrest and detention of persons, or the surrender or transfer of 
the accused to the Tribunal.187 As such, the ability of States to exercise jurisdiction over 
matters under the purview of the ICTR and the ICTY is expressly limited to those actions 
that do not conflict with the needs and demands of those tribunals. 
The ICC, on the other hand, is designed on a system of complementary jurisdic-
tion.188 The ICC exercises jurisdiction over those alleged to have committed genocide, 
war crimes, or crimes against humanity, only insofar as the Member State with domestic 
jurisdiction over those crimes is unable or unwilling to prosecute the perpetrators.189  
States retain primary responsibility for prosecuting these crimes if they occur within their 
borders or are committed by their nationals.190 As Professor Bassiouni has explained, the 
ICC’s jurisdiction is based upon a delegation of jurisdiction from Member States to the 
ICC.191 The one exception is the case of a situation being referred to the ICC prosecutor 
by the U.N. Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.192  
Such referrals, if they relate to crimes occurring in the territory of a State that is not a 
party to the ICC, implicate the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In 2005, the Security 
                                                          
 182. Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 5(1). 
 183. Id. at art. 5(2). 
 184. See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 34535th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. 
Res. 808, and U.N. SCOR 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (establishing both the ICTR and 
the ICTY). 
 185. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 29, at arts. 40(1), 42(1). 
 186. ICTR, supra note 29, at art. 8(2); ICTY, supra note 29, at art 9(2). 
 187. ICTR, supra note 29, at art. 28; ICTY, supra note 29, at art. 29. 
 188. Rome Statute, supra note 29, at pmbl. 
 189. Id. at art. 17. 
 190. Id. at art. 12. 
 191. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 92. 
 192. Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 13(b). 
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Council made such a referral when it authorized the ICC to investigate and prosecute 
crimes committed in Sudan’s Darfur region.193 In 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC 
handed down an indictment and arrest warrant for Sudanese president, Omar Hassan al-
Bashir, for five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes.194 
Given the differing scope among these institutions, their divergent approaches is 
completely sensible. The ICTR and ICTY were created to deal with specific crises in 
failed or failing States. It was taken as given that authorities in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia were either unable or unwilling to try the perpetrators of international 
crimes.195 The ICC is not limited to crimes relating to a particular time or place and 
counts among its Member States many nations with sophisticated and functioning judi-
cial systems. Given its limited resources and potentially unlimited crimes to investigate, 
it is eminently reasonable for the ICC to only exercise jurisdiction where the domestic 
exercise of jurisdiction is impracticable or not forthcoming. 
The ICC, the ICTR, and the ICTY were also spared the difficulties faced by the 
IMT in prosecuting internationally recognized crimes for which no extraterritorial juris-
diction was specified. By the time these three entities were founded, the Geneva Conven-
tions and the Genocide Convention, all of which include language permitting the applica-
tion of universal jurisdiction or jurisdiction by such tribunals, had entered into force.196 
Like the IMT, the ICC, ICTR, and ICTY do not provide clear examples of the ex-
ercise of universal jurisdiction. The ICC does exercise universal jurisdiction, but only in 
limited cases, and only at the instigation of the U.N. Security Council, not the Office of 
the Prosecutor. The two ad hoc tribunals are geographically and temporally limited to 
very specific conflicts. While the exercise of jurisdiction by these two tribunals is not 
linked to territory or nationality of the accused or victims, these courts’ existence chal-
lenges, rather than strengthens, the prerogatives of States to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. 
D. Contemporary Exercises of Universal Jurisdiction by Individual States 
In recent years, there have been more and more attempts to try the “worst of the 
worst” under theories of universal jurisdiction, especially in cases where war criminals 
and mass murderers would otherwise escape prosecution due to sovereign immunity, 
amnesties, or lack of will to prosecute by their home States. Some of the more prominent 
examples include the Spanish attempted prosecution of Augosto Pinochet,197 and Bel-
                                                          
 193. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (2005). 
 194. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Issues a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Al Bashir, Presi-
dent of Sudan (Mar. 4, 2009). 
 195. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, which ended the genocide in Rwanda, took control of the government and 
detained as many as 130,000 suspected genocidaires in appalling conditions with little hope of ever facing a 
fair trial. See BASS, supra note 62, at 306. Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, who would later be indicted for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity by the ICTY, was still Serbia’s president when the ICTY was formed, 
and refused to turn over to the court-indicted individuals. See BASS, supra note 62, at 256. 
 196. Indeed, the statutes for all three courts explicitly rely on the Geneva Convention’s Common Article 3 to 
define the extent of jurisdiction over war crimes. ICTR, supra note 29, at art. 5. 
 197. See Opinion of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause Ex Parte Pinochet (Mar. 24, 1999), 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pino1.htm. Within this arti-
cle, reference to the Pinochet case includes the entire collection of documents pertaining to the litigation pro-
cess. For reference, the applicable cases include: Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 
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gium’s universal jurisdiction law, that was adopted in 1993, and used to prosecute 
Rwandan genocidaires and to indict then Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, for war 
crimes relating to the Sabra and Shatila massacres. 
1. Pinochet 
As an initial matter, the Spanish request for extradition of General Pinochet, fol-
lowed closely by requests from France and Switzerland, were not principally based on 
universal jurisdiction. On October 16, 1998, Spain issued an arrest warrant for Pinochet 
in connection with the torture and murder of Spanish citizens in Chile during his presi-
dency.198 The following day, Pinochet was arrested by British authorities199 (he had trav-
eled to the United Kingdom for back surgery).200 The government of Chile immediately 
lodged a protest, claiming that Pinochet had immunity as a senator for life.201 Pinochet 
also moved to quash the warrant on these grounds.202 On October 22, 1998, Spain issued 
a second international arrest warrant, alleging that Pinochet had committed torture, hos-
tage-taking, and murder.203 The Swiss government also made a request for extradition to 
the United Kingdom in the case of the kidnapping and disappearance of a person with 
dual Swiss and Chilean citizenship.204 The French also filed an extradition request in the 
case of French nationals who had “disappeared” or were killed in Chile.205 The first 
Spanish arrest warrant and the extradition requests by Switzerland and France were 
based on the passive personality theory of jurisdiction, not universal jurisdiction.206 
The House of Lords determined that Pinochet did not have immunity against the 
charges in the Spanish arrest warrants, either under the theory of State immunity or im-
munity for a former Head of State.207 This decision was set aside, however, because one 
of the judges involved in the decision had ties to Amnesty International, which had ad-
                                                                                                                                               
1998); R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 
1998), annulled by R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), 2 
W.L.R. 272 (H.L. 1999); and R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999). 
 198. United Kingdom: The Pinochet Case—Universal Jurisdiction and Absence of Immunity for Crimes 
Against Humanity, AMNESTY INT’L. (Jan. 1999), 
http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/EUR45/001/1999/en/63cc2d71-e35a-11dd-a06d-
790733721318/eur450011999en.pdf . 
 199. Id. 
 200. Clifford Krauss, Britain Arrests Pinochet to Face Charges by Spain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/18/world/britain-arrests-pinochet-to-face-charges-by-spain.html. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Ex Parte Pinochet, (2000) 1 A.C. 61. [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. The Pinochet Case, supra note 197, at 2. 
 205. Id. 
 206. The second Spanish arrest warrant arguably relies in part on universal jurisdiction, since it seeks to try 
Pinochet for crimes against nationals of countries other than Spain, along with those committed against Span-
iards. The judges of Britain’s National Court Criminal Division held that  
Spain is competent to judge the events by virtue of the principle of universal prosecution 
for certain crimes—a category of international law—established by our internal legisla-
tion. It also has a legitimate interest in the exercise of such jurisdiction because more 
than 50 nationals were killed or disappeared in Chile, victims of the repression reported 
in the proceedings. 
Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 202 (emphasis added).  
 207. Id. 
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vocated in favor of extradition.208 A rehearing was scheduled for January 1999, and a 
new decision was issued in March of that year. 
The March decision by the Law Lords held that, under the principle of double 
criminality (requiring that the conduct alleged in the extradition request be illegal under 
both the requesting country’s laws and that of the extraditing country), torture committed 
outside the United Kingdom before the U.K. adopted the Torture Convention (December 
8, 1988) was not a crime under British law.209 The decision held that the Torture Con-
vention negated any claim of sovereign immunity to prosecution, which meant that Pino-
chet could be extradited and tried on the count of torture that occurred after December 8, 
1988.210 The judgment also held that Pinochet did enjoy immunity from prosecutions for 
murder and conspiracy to commit murder, since the ordinary rule of State immunity still 
applied to those crimes.211 So holding, the Law Lords declared that the extradition of Pi-
nochet could go forward, but under radically diminished charges.212 
In January 2000, however, Home Secretary Jack Straw determined that Pinochet 
should not be extradited, citing Pinochet’s poor health.213 The government of Belgium 
protested this move and began the process of seeking the intervention of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”).214 In March of 2000, however, Straw declared that Pinochet was 
free to return to Chile.215 Belgium, Spain, and France indicated that they would not ap-
peal the decision to the ICJ.216 Switzerland also indicated it was unlikely to challenge the 
decision.217 Pinochet returned to Chile, but was eventually stripped of his immunity and 
charged with a number of offenses, including murder and human rights abuses.218  His 
frail health, however, meant that he never stood trial for any crime.219 He died at the age 
of ninety-one in December 2006.220 
2. Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Law 
Dating to 1993, Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law began modestly as a codifica-
tion of Belgium’s obligations to punish violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.221 
The law was amended in 1999, expanding its scope to include genocide and crimes 
against humanity.222 The law allowed individuals to file complaints in Belgium for atroc-
                                                          
 208. The Pinochet Case, supra note 197, at 2. 
 209. Ex Parte Pinochet (1999) UKHL, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pino1.htm. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Ian Black & Jamie Wilson, Belgium Moves to Halt Pinochet Flight, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2000), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jan/26/pinochet.chile. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Pinochet Set Free, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/663170.stm. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Jan McGirk, Pinochet is ‘Stripped of His Immunity,’ THE INDEP. (Aug. 3, 2000), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pinochet-is-stripped-of-his-immunity-711326.html. 
 219. Chile’s General Pinochet Dies at 91, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6167237.stm. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 888, 889 (2003). 
 222. Id. 
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ities committed abroad.223 The law did not require that the victim or accused be Belgian, 
or that the exercise of jurisdiction be supported by treaty obligations.224 The Belgian law 
allowed for criminal prosecution of individuals for acts committed which had no ties to 
Belgium. The universal jurisdiction law was used in 2001 to try four Rwandan defend-
ants (two of whom were nuns accused of aiding in the slaughter of 7,000 people who 
sought refuge in their convent) for participation in the genocide.225 The four defendants 
fled to Belgium (the former colonial power in Rwanda) after the genocide.226 All four 
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from twelve to twenty years.227 
The universal jurisdiction law was later invoked in a case brought against Ariel 
Sharon, the then Prime Minister of Israel, for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres 
in Lebanon in 1982.228 The law was originally assumed to apply regardless of whether 
the individual was within Belgium’s custody or control, and led to a number of proceed-
ings initiated by individuals and groups229 against Yassir Arafat, Fidel Castro, Saddam 
Hussein, and Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani.230 This reading of the law was re-
jected in 2002 by an appeals court in Belgium, which ruled that the country did not have 
jurisdiction to try the case against Ariel Sharon, as Sharon was not on Belgian soil. The 
Court of Cassation overruled the appeals court, finding that Sharon’s absence from the 
jurisdiction was not a bar to proceeding. However, it did hold that Sharon was immune 
from prosecution as a Head of State.231 
Shortly thereafter, several criminal complaints were filed in Belgian courts against 
former U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Colin Powell, alleging war crimes during 
the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1991.232 Under intense pressure from the United States 
(which indicated that the law could affect the continued presence of NATO headquarters 
in Belgium),233 Belgium revised its law in May 2003, stating that only the public prose-
cutor could initiate a suit with no connection to Belgium.234 After a criminal complaint 
was filed in June against George W. Bush and Tony Blair for the use of force in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Belgium revised the law yet again.235 The new Belgian law on universal 
                                                          
 223. Loi Relative à la Répression des Infractions Graves aux Conventions internationales de Genève du 12 
août 1949 aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977 (1993) (Belg.). Additional information regarding this law can be 
found at http://www.law.kuleuven.be/jura/art/37n2/lemaitre.htm#N_2_. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Belgium Puts Four Rwandans on Trial for Human Rights Violations, THE INDEP., Apr. 17, 2001, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/belgium-puts-four-rwandans-on-trial-for-human-rights-
violations-753512.html. 
 226. See Keith B. Richburg, Rwandan Nuns Jailed in Genocide, WORLDWIDE RELIGIOUS NEWS (June 9, 
2001), http://wwrn.org/articles/10502/?&place=africa. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Ratner, supra note 221, at 889-90. 
 229. Like many jurisdictions, Belgium allows individuals to initiate criminal proceedings, which are then 
prosecuted by the public prosecutor.  
 230. See Ratner, supra note 221, at 890. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, Extraterri-
torial Application of NEPA, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 962, 985 (2003). 
 233. Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks its Prosecutorial Zeal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/world/belgium-rethinks-its-prosecutorial-zeal.html. 
 234. See Loi Modifiant la Loi du 16 juin 1993 Relative à la Répression des Violations Graves du Droit Inter-
national Humanitaire et l’Article 144ter du Code Judiciaire, MONITEUR BELGE 24846 (May 7, 2003). 
 235. Murphy, supra note 232, at 986-87. 
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jurisdiction more closely resembles the extraterritorial jurisdiction laws of other Europe-
an nations.236 The Belgian law now requires that the victim or defendant be a Belgian 
national or resident, or that prosecution be required under Belgium’s treaty obligations. 
The public prosecutor retains sole discretion to initiate prosecutions and may decline to 
do so when “respect for Belgium’s international obligations” would require it.237 These 
new limitations on jurisdiction cause the law to fall squarely within the active and pas-
sive personality theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Initially hailed as a watershed in human rights law, the Belgian universal jurisdic-
tion law was a radical leap forward in the application of universal jurisdiction. It col-
lapsed, however, under its own weight. External political pressure proved to be too great, 
and the law could not be sustained. As of this time, the world seems ill-prepared to han-
dle the broad exercise of universal criminal law jurisdiction, divorced from treaty obliga-
tions by individual countries. Nonetheless, treaty-based universal jurisdiction and univer-
sal jurisdiction over several well-defined crimes are broadly recognized by States and 
scholars alike, even though politics have limited the actual exercise of such jurisdic-
tion.238 How universal jurisdiction develops from this point forward, however, remains 
an open question. We may see States restart the march toward a broad conception of uni-
versal jurisdiction based upon the notion of heinousness and the analogy to piracy. 
In Part II, this article argues that universal jurisdiction should not be based upon 
the heinousness of the offense and that any expansion of universal jurisdiction ought not 
be predicated on a comparison between the crime in question and piracy. Instead, States 
should look toward the practical realities of prosecution and how universal jurisdiction 
affects the ability of States to achieve optimal levels of prosecution and deterrence. This 
theory of universal jurisdiction will be referred to as the “optimization theory.” 
PART II 
The picture painted by the current state of universal jurisdiction is not altogether 
clear. Broadly speaking, some crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of 
customary international law. Universal jurisdiction over these crimes—typically slavery, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture—is justified on the basis of 
the particularly heinous nature of the crimes. Other crimes, such as terrorism financing, 
hijacking, and hostage-taking are subject to universal jurisdiction on the basis of a treaty, 
not their status as jus cogens crimes. In practice, universal jurisdiction has been used on-
ly very rarely by States in the cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or geno-
cide.239 When States have tried to exercise universal jurisdiction over these crimes in re-
cent years, they have faced stiff international political resistance.240 Instead, these crimes 
have recently been subject not to universal jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction of interna-
                                                          
 236. See e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 198 (discussing the extraterritorial jurisdiction laws of a number 
of leading states). 
 237. See Loi Relative aux Violations Graves du Droit International Humanitaire, supra note 234, at arts. 14-
16. 
 238. See BASS, supra note 62, at 327-29. 
 239. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 118-24. 
 240. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law). 
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tional tribunals, typically exercising a sort of modified territorial jurisdiction.241 Notwith-
standing the universal condemnation of these crimes, there is little enthusiasm outside 
the realm of international legal scholars for actually applying universal jurisdiction to 
them.242 
On the other hand, hijacking and hostage-taking are generally crimes committed on 
a much smaller scale and with far fewer victims than genocide or war crimes,243 yet there 
is strong support for applying universal jurisdiction to these crimes without any reference 
to their heinousness or any attempts to analogize them to piracy.244 Despite this dichoto-
my, there has been very little critical analysis of the justification for universal jurisdic-
tion’s growth and development. 
A.  Analysis of Piracy and Universal Jurisdiction 
Instead of uncritically accepting the piracy analogy and applying it to the other 
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, we should look at the critical first steps in creat-
ing and expanding universal jurisdiction. Piracy was the first, and for hundreds of years, 
the only crime subject to universal jurisdiction. But it is inconceivable that for centuries, 
piracy was considered so uniquely heinous among crimes that it needed to be subject to 
universal jurisdiction. As explained by Professor Kontorovich, piracy was armed robbery 
at sea—a serious crime, but not unique in its threats to life or property.245 Indeed, the ar-
gument that piracy is more morally repugnant or heinous than other crimes is thoroughly 
undercut by the fact that States hired pirates as privateers to attack and rob ships of ene-
my States.246 It would be irrational for States to condemn piracy as uniquely heinous and 
then engage in piracy through privateers. The only difference between piracy and priva-
teering is whether it is sanctioned by a State.247 This distinction is enough to exclude pri-
vateering from universal jurisdiction, as piracy must be done for private gain and not at 
the direction of a State.248 
If piracy were truly heinous, the imprimatur of a State would not be sufficient to 
vitiate that heinousness. State sanction, in fact, was resoundingly rejected as a defense 
against claims of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.249 The argument 
that the heinousness of piracy justifies the application of universal jurisdiction is unsup-
portable. 
Instead of looking at the purported heinousness of piracy, we should consider the 
                                                          
 241. See ICTR, supra note 29; see also ICTY, supra note 29; Rome Statute, supra note 29. 
 242. See BASS, supra note 62, at 327-29. 
 243. See Dempsey, supra note 158, at 651-52. The hijackings of September 11, 2001, stand out as a stark 
exception to the prior trends in hijacking in which hijackers tended to use the plane and its passengers as bar-
gaining chips to accomplish political or monetary goals. 
 244. Serge Schmemann, Hamadei to Stay in Germany; Bonn to Try Him in Hijacking, N.Y. TIMES  
(June 25, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/25/world/hamadei-to-stay-in-germany-bonn-to-try-him-in-
hijacking.html. 
 245. Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 191. 
 246. Id. at 210. 
 247. Id. at 210-11. 
 248. High Seas Convention, supra note 34, at art. 15(1) (defining piracy as “[a]ny illegal acts of violence, 
detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or a private aircraft.”); see also Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 214. 
 249. Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 210. 
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other reasons why piracy was treated as unique and why pirates were held to be “enemies 
of all mankind.” Pirates, unlike privateers, were indiscriminate in selecting their targets 
and were thus a potential threat to all seafaring nations and their ships. Privateers, on the 
other hand, operated under instructions in the form of letters of marque and reprisal—
limiting the ships on which the privateers could prey to those belonging to enemies of the 
issuing State.250 Neutral vessels and those sailing under the issuing State’s flag were off-
limits.251 
States’ interests in prosecuting pirates, regardless of the nationality of the perpetra-
tors or victims, flows logically from the fact that all maritime States could suffer at the 
hands of pirates—neutrality provided no protection. Furthermore, because States could 
not patrol the whole of the high seas to protect their ships, merchant vessels remained at 
particular risk of attack with no way to seek protection from their own State. If a military 
vessel could only intercept and capture pirates if they or their victims were of the same 
nationality as the military ship, far more pirates would have escaped punishment. By al-
lowing any State to punish pirates, universal jurisdiction prevented pirates from avoiding 
punishment just because they happened to be interdicted by a ship of a different national-
ity from their victims. Also, because universal jurisdiction over piracy presents a fairly 
minor infringement on the sovereignty of States because it does not involve an incursion 
onto another State’s territory, it presents no serious challenge to the Westphalian concept 
of State sovereignty. 
Piracy was a major threat to maritime trade and the relations among States. Given 
the potential for economic loss pirates presented, States were acting in their own best in-
terest by recognizing the right of every State to capture and punish pirates and exercising 
that right whenever they managed to do so. Universal jurisdiction was thus a pragmatic, 
not moralistic approach to deterring and punishing piracy—a crime which every State 
had an economic interest in curbing. 
Our contemporary experiences with piracy are remarkably similar in the problems 
they present and the justifications they provide for universal jurisdiction over the crime. 
Somali pirates have attacked Saudi, Turkish, Ukranian, Yemeni, and Panamanian 
ships.252 The attacks are often over in minutes, making it virtually impossible for victim 
ships to attain assistance from their own navies.253 While improvements in Somalia’s in-
ternal governance and the use of new security measures by trade vessels have dramatical-
ly reduced the effect of piracy in just the last year, gains have been fragile and remain 
reversible.254 Estimates indicate that these pirate attacks have cost billions of dollars per 
year and have negatively affected international trade.255 To deter and punish pirate at-
                                                          
 250. Id. at 212-13. 
 251. Id. at 212. 
 252. See Mark McDonald, China’s Navy to Join Pirate Patrols, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/world/asia/27navy.html; Norimitsu Onishi & Mark McDonald, Japan 
Says It Will Send Anti-Piracy Force to Somalia’s Coast, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/world/africa/29pirates.html. 
 253. See Gardner, supra note 19. 
 254. See Frank Gardner, Somali Piracy: A Broken Business Model?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20549056. 
 255. See Christopher Alessi & Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/combating_maritime_piracy.html.  
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tacks, the coast of east Africa is currently being patrolled by Combined Task Force 151 
(“CTF 151”), a multinational coalition, which presently includes Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.256 Additional 
ships from Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and China have also been pa-
trolling the waters off Somalia’s coast for pirates.257 Because it would be impossible for 
countries to protect all of their own vessels traveling in these waters, the countries in-
volved in CTF 151 respond to attacks on third party ships and interdict pirates. 
The nature of commercial navigation of the Gulf of Aden makes it particularly lu-
crative to pirates and, conversely, particularly vexing to States which rely on goods trav-
eling through these waters. Piracy off the Somali coast is particularly concerning for oil-
importing countries. Much of the world’s exported oil travels through the Gulf of Aden. 
The Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker worth $100 million and carrying another $100 mil-
lion worth of oil was hijacked in November of 2008, and released on January 9, 2009, 
after a ransom of $3 million was paid.258 The threat to the trade in oil is so significant 
that States which rarely project naval power outside their region have sent ships to com-
bat piracy. Japan, a pacifistic nation which only rarely deploys its military, has sent naval 
forces to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Japan imports 90 percent of its oil from the 
Middle East and it is the world’s second largest importer of oil, behind the United 
States.259 China, which imports 60 percent of its oil from the Middle East, also deployed 
warships to patrol the region.260 This marks the first time China has deployed its navy 
outside the east-Asia region since the fifteenth century.261 However, oil is not the only 
valuable product which is transported through those waters. More troubling than even the 
seizure of the oil tanker was the 2008 hijacking of a Ukranian freighter carrying weapons 
and armaments.262 Of potentially greater concern than the fact that pirates have seized 
both valuable and dangerous cargo in their hijackings is the possibility that a pirate at-
tack might result in the closure of strategic international waterways upon which the 
world economy is dependent.263 
Somali pirates have cost their victims billions of dollars,264 but it would be difficult 
to contend that they are particularly heinous when compared to war criminals and geno-
cidaires. Somali pirates allegedly treat their hostages reasonably well—not beating them 
and keeping them fed until the ransom is paid.265 According to the pirates themselves, all 
                                                          
 256. Cdr. Alastair Clark, Counter Piracy Operations, Challenges, Shortfalls and Lessons Learned, 
COMBINED MARITIME FORCES OPERATION 2 (2009), http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/141/pdf/PS-
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 257. Onishi & McDonald, supra note 252.  
 258. Mohammed Ibrahim & Graham Bowley, Pirates Say They Freed Saudi Tanker for $3 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2009), 
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 260. McDonald, supra note 252. 
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 262. Ibrahim & Bowley, supra note 258. 
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they want is money.266 Until recent efforts reduced the likelihood of success of pirate 
missions, piracy was one of the few well-paying livelihoods available to Somalis.267 
None of this is to suggest that piracy does not expose its victims to significant threat of 
death or injury. The International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of 
Commerce reported that in the first nine months of 2008, a total of 581 crewmembers 
were taken hostage, nine were killed and seven were missing and presumed dead.268 
Notwithstanding these numbers, contemporary piracy seems to be an economically-
motivated crime, though a fairly violent one. The effects are also largely economic. On 
top of ransoms paid, there are additional costs associated with piracy. By attacking large 
vessels in major shipping routes, pirates have caused insurance rates to increase and have 
also led to the expensive re-routing of ships through safer shipping lanes.269 
While there has been widespread cooperation to interdict pirates, efforts to bring 
them to justice are surprisingly underdeveloped, given the long history of universal juris-
diction over piracy. In 2008, the United States and the United Kingdom entered into an 
agreement with Kenya, whereby Kenya would try pirates captured by American and 
British vessels off Africa’s eastern coast.270 Kenya has previously tried Somali pirates 
captured by American naval ships,271 but the 2008 agreement was designed to formalize 
the relationship and help clarify confusion over who should exercise jurisdiction over the 
pirates.272 Despite the 2008 agreement, confusion arose over Kenya’s role in trying pi-
rates when a Kenyan judge ruled in 2010 that the country did not have jurisdiction over 
Somali pirates caught outside of Kenya’s territory and ordered them repatriated to Soma-
lia.273 In 2012, Kenya’s Court of Appeals clarified that the nation’s courts could try pi-
rates caught anywhere in international waters, holding that “[p]iracy has negative effects 
on the country’s economy and any state, even if not directly affected by piracy must try 
and punish the offenders.”274 Even though there is universal jurisdiction over pirates, that 
does not mean that countries have been eager to undertake the burden of trying pirates.275 
States have shown a strong willingness to patrol the Gulf of Aden and interdict and 
capture pirates, regardless of their nationality or that of their victims. This should not be 
surprising given the economic interests in suppressing piracy discussed above. Numerous 
States are currently working in coordination with one another to patrol the region and 
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protect commercial vessels.276 The matter has also been specifically addressed by the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, passed in June 2008, which called up-
on willing States to take part in maritime operations to patrol the waters off the coast of 
Somalia and pursue and capture pirates.277 The resolution allowed States to enter Soma-
lia’s territorial waters to repress piracy.278 Legal enforcement, however, remains in its 
infancy, though the agreement among the United States, United Kingdom, and Kenya 
shows a growing willingness to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction to the situa-
tion.279 
While the weapons and tactics may have changed, piracy in the twenty-first centu-
ry poses the same type of threat as piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
States today have the same incentive to cooperate in the eradication of piracy to protect 
their own vessels and to maintain the free and safe navigation of international waters. 
Though the modern piracy example demonstrates the need for international cooperation 
and the difficulties inherent in prosecuting this crime, the question of whether analogies 
between piracy and other crimes provides a logically sound explanation for the expan-
sion of universal jurisdiction remains outstanding. 
B. The Original Analogy: Piracy and Slave Trading 
As argued above, piracy became the subject of universal jurisdiction as a matter of 
pragmatism, not because piracy was particularly heinous among crimes. This leads, 
however, to the question of how the concept of universal jurisdiction and heinousness 
became linked in the first place. It is unquestioned that scholars and human rights activ-
ists today believe that universal jurisdiction under customary international law for the 
crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and slavery stem from 
the heinousness of those crimes.280 What is unclear is how universal jurisdiction mor-
phed from the most pragmatic way to address the crime of piracy on the high seas into 
the proper response to crimes of shocking moral repugnance. This article posits that the 
answer lies in Great Britain’s response to the slave trade—the very first expansion of 
universal jurisdiction beyond piracy. 
Britain began its campaign to abolish the slave trade with the passage of the Slave 
Trade Act of 1807.281 The Act prohibited the slave trade within the British Empire 
(though slavery remained legal until the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833). As described 
above, over the next few decades the British entered into a series of first bilateral, and 
then multilateral agreements to suppress the slave trade.282 Yet while the Quintuple Trea-
ty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade declared slavery to be piracy,283 it is 
helpful to unpack this claim and determine whether it is warranted. 
                                                          
 276. See id. 
 277. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). 
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 280. See Bassouini, supra note 1; PRINCETON PRINCIPALS, supra note 8; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 11. 
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Historically, piracy was widely recognized as sea robbery.284 Though dangerous, it 
was a largely economic crime.285 It threatened international trade and the free navigation 
of international waters. Ships of all maritime States stood to be potential victims of pira-
cy, creating for all States a strong incentive to deter and punish the crime. In contrast, 
Britain did not stand to gain economically by outlawing the slave trade. In 1807, in fact, 
Britain had the largest share of the slave trade in the world.286 Nor did the slave trade in-
terfere with British ships or subjects. Ships carrying slaves posed no unique threat to oth-
er vessels or the free navigation of the seas. Slave ships were clearly not engaging in sea 
robbery the way that pirates were—they did not threaten international trade or other ves-
sels, or State security. What set slave ships apart was the inherently despicable fact that 
they were carrying human beings in inhumane conditions to deliver them into bondage. 
Evidence of the historical debate supports the assertion that Britain’s reasons for 
abolishing the slave trade, first domestically, then universally, were primarily moral in 
character. Led by ardent abolitionists such as William Wilberforce, British politicians 
and diplomats sought universal jurisdiction over slave trading despite the economic cost 
of suppressing the slave trade.287 While universal jurisdiction over piracy expanded 
States’ rights to punish conduct that they all had economic and security interests in sup-
pressing, the abolition of the slave trade was driven by the United Kingdom, not out of 
economic or political self-interest, but as a moral imperative. As Professor Jenny Mar-
tinez argues, the fight against slavery and the slave trade was the first real victory for in-
ternational human rights law.288 Nineteenth century antislavery courts, which freed al-
most 80,000 slaves, were the first international judicial institutions to vindicate the rights 
of individuals.289 
Given the fact that the crimes of piracy and slave trading are substantively distinct 
and that the reasons States had in suppressing these crimes were likewise distinguishable, 
why did the signatories of the Quintuple Treaty agree that slave trading was piracy? 
There is no reason to believe that they operated under the assumption that all crimes on 
the high seas were piracy. States continued to exercise territorial and active and passive 
personality jurisdiction over their registered ships and citizens for other crimes. The most 
plausible explanation lies in the fact that the Quintuple Treaty represented the very first 
attempt to expand universal jurisdiction beyond piracy. Prior bilateral treaties had given 
the signatories the right of visitation of each other’s vessels, but certainly did not allow 
States to interfere with slave ships registered to non-parties. Expanding universal juris-
diction beyond the strict limits that had held for centuries was a bold change to the law of 
nations. Such a drastic move was likely made more palatable by likening slave trading to 
piracy, despite the differences between the two crimes. 
                                                          
 284. See Kontorovich, supra note 6. 
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C. Universal Jurisdiction: Two Distinct Paths of Evolution 
From this point forward, it is not difficult to delineate the expansion and evolution 
of universal jurisdiction from slave trading to other morally heinous crimes, such as gen-
ocide and crimes against humanity. However, we should note that there was a parallel 
track of expanding universal jurisdiction over crimes which are substantively similar to 
piracy, i.e., hostage-taking, terrorism, and hijacking. Independent of the development of 
customary international law-based universal jurisdiction was the growing acceptance of 
universal jurisdiction over other crimes, based not necessarily on their heinousness, but 
by the decision of States, acting in their security, economic, and political self-interests to 
expand jurisdiction to ensure adequate levels of deterrence and punishment for particular 
cross-border crimes. 
1. Comparison: Jus Cogens versus Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction 
Setting aside piracy, when we compare the jus cogens and the treaty-based crimes 
of universal jurisdiction, certain patterns emerge. The jus cogens crimes—genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, slavery, and apartheid—are violations of hu-
man rights, which are subject to universal jurisdiction regardless of whether they are 
wholly domestic or international in nature and provide no immunity for State actors. The 
conventions and statutes codifying the jus cogens crimes make clear that there is no re-
quirement that the crimes be international in scope.290 Wholly domestic acts of genocide, 
slavery, war crimes, torture, etc. are properly within the scope of universal jurisdiction. 
With respect to the question of State actors and immunity, none of these conventions 
recognizes exceptions for acts of State. The Torture Convention, in fact, is limited to the 
conduct of State actors.291 The Geneva Conventions also do not recognize immunity for 
State actors and indeed are principally concerned with State actors in the form of State 
militaries.292 The Apartheid Convention and the Genocide Convention apply to both 
State and non-State actors.293 The former has never been invoked since the collapse of 
the apartheid regime in South Africa (obviously a State actor). The latter has been used 
to prosecute both State and non-State actors, including the highest level officials in gov-
ernment, including Adolf Eichmann and Slobodan Milosevic.294 As defined in the ICC 
Statute, being a State actor is no defense to allegations of war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, or genocide and provide for neither substantive nor procedural immunity before 
that tribunal.295 
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The unique characteristics of the jus cogens crimes often create complexities in the 
practice of exercising universal jurisdiction. While States often sit in judgment of foreign 
nationals under the territorial and passive personality theories of jurisdiction, judging the 
conduct of foreign State actors is far rarer. Many countries have foreign sovereign im-
munity laws, which prevent domestic courts from rendering judgments on the acts of 
foreign States (though there are exceptions to the general rule for precisely the crimes at 
issue here).296 In the United States, the federal courts have recognized the immunity of 
foreign sovereigns from charges brought in the United States since at least 1812.297 The 
idea that State actors can be tried by the courts of other countries for human rights abuses 
is a relatively recent one, first enunciated in the Nuremberg Principles, which were 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950: 
 
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under inter-
national law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. . . . The 
fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime un-
der international law acted as Head of State or responsible government 
official does not relieve him from responsibility under international 
law.298 
 
While a critically important development in international law, it stood deeply at odds 
with hundreds of years of international law and practice.299 
Despite the pronouncements in the Nuremberg Principles, we have seen numerous 
instances of States accepting foreign sovereign immunity as a defense against the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes. As discussed above, the Belgian 
Court of Cassation, prior to the revision of Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law, held that 
the State could not try Ariel Sharon, not because he was outside the jurisdiction, but be-
cause he enjoyed sovereign immunity as a Head of State.300 Allegations made against 
Heads of State in Belgian courts caused such outrage in the United States and Israel that 
Belgium eventually revised its law to dramatically limit its exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction.301 The Law Lords of Great Britain also found that General Pinochet enjoyed 
immunity for the vast majority of the charges brought against him, because there was no 
mechanism for international prosecution of torture prior to December 1988 (when Great 
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Britain adopted the Torture Convention), though the international legal obligation not to 
torture arguably dates back to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, and torture was clearly proscribed under international law in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966.302 
The inclusion of wholly domestic crimes is also a complicating factor and one that 
stands in contrast with the Westphalian notion that States are sovereign and their internal 
matters are their own concerns. An attempt by one State to prosecute crimes which oc-
curred within the territory of another could be seen as an improper usurpation of that 
State’s sovereign prerogatives, which could lead to conflict.303 Critics of universal juris-
diction point to the potentially destabilizing effects of foreign States meddling in the af-
fairs of other nations especially when those nations are trying to overcome past instabil-
ity and a legacy of human rights abuses.304 In the view of such critics, the interested State 
is in the best position to determine how to address past wrongs—whether it is with a 
general amnesty, a truth and reconciliation process, or trials.305 Yet there is widespread 
agreement among scholars that the Nuremberg Principles are settled international law 
and amnesties are incompatible with universal jurisdiction.306 Despite this consensus, 
State practice bears out the fact that political considerations regarding amnesties and 
concerns about interfering in peace processes and destabilizing inter-State relationships 
come into play when States consider whether to exercise universal jurisdiction.307 While 
there are examples of successful applications of universal jurisdiction to wholly domestic 
matters, including the Belgian prosecution of Rwandans accused of genocide,308 such 
prosecutions by national courts remain rare. The ICTR and ICTY, however, have tried 
and convicted numerous defendants for charges that were domestic in nature.309 
When one considers the fact that many of the grossest violations of human rights 
are committed by State actors310 and that numerous recent incidences of genocide 
(Rwanda, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Sudan), torture (Pinochet’s Chile, El Salva-
dor), and other brutal and systematic violations of jus cogens norms occur completely 
within the traditional jurisdiction of one State, the haphazard and anemic punishment of 
these crimes becomes understandable.311 As Professor Gary Bass has argued in chroni-
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cling attempts to punish international crimes dating back to the Napoleonic Wars, judi-
cial redress is far more likely to be sought by liberal States with strong legal traditions.312 
Nevertheless, even liberal States do not go about trying every violation of a jus cogens 
criminal law. As Bass argues, States are far more likely to prosecute an international 
crime when the perpetrators have victimized their own citizens.313 Bass’s theory is borne 
out by the prosecutions of the IMT after World War II, and the decisions by Spain, 
France, and Switzerland to seek the extradition of Pinochet for crimes committed against 
their own citizens.314 It also explains why the British abandoned an attempted tribunal to 
try Turkish officials and military officers for the Armenian genocide—there was insuffi-
cient political will to maintain the necessary British presence in Turkey to prosecute the 
cases in the face of growing Turkish nationalism and the incipient revolution.315 
According to Bass’s theory, States are also far more likely to seek judicial solu-
tions when they do not involve putting their soldiers’ lives at risk.316 If punishing an in-
ternational criminal requires first finding and capturing him, which is a rather dangerous 
exercise if that individual is a politician or officer with military resources at hand, then 
prosecution becomes far less likely. As a result, war criminals who are never militarily 
defeated are rarely punished.317 They are only punished if there is strong support among 
domestic constituencies of the States capable of intervention. Only then do we see the 
action necessary to bring such criminals to justice. However, as Samantha Power con-
vincingly demonstrated in “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, 
such interventions are rare and unpredictable.318 
In the case of jus cogens crimes of universal jurisdiction, it has often been the case 
that good intentions and genuine moral outrage have run headlong into particularly vex-
ing issues concerning potentially politicized prosecutions of foreign leaders, which risks 
upturning delicate peace processes, antagonizing other States, and having to risk the lives 
of one’s own soldiers in order to do it. There may not be a strong domestic constituency 
demanding the exercise of jurisdiction in instances where the State’s own citizens were 
the victims. Thus, it should come as no surprise that universal jurisdiction over jus co-
gens crimes is widely recognized by scholars and almost as widely ignored by States.319 
In contrast, the crimes subject to universal jurisdiction as a result of treaty obliga-
tions must be international in nature and in most instances acts of State are expressly ex-
cluded. Specifically, universal jurisdiction only applies to hostage-taking, terrorism, and 
hijacking if it is not a purely domestic crime.320 If a hijacker takes over a domestic flight 
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which never leaves the country of origin, then it is not a matter for universal jurisdic-
tion.321 The same is true for domestic acts of terrorism, which are covered by interna-
tional treaties. 
Unlike war crimes, torture, and genocide, the treaty-based crimes are also not typi-
cally committed by State actors. In fact, the terrorism treaties expressly exclude State 
conduct.322 For example, the Nuclear Terrorism Treaty explicitly carves out the use of 
nuclear weapons by States as not subject to that convention.323 The Hostage Convention 
and the Hijacking Convention are also limited as to how they apply to State actors, as 
they specifically exclude acts of war.324 
For the reasons stated above, treaty-based universal jurisdiction crimes more close-
ly resemble piracy than jus cogens crimes do. Like treaty-based universal jurisdiction 
crimes, piracy is only subject to universal jurisdiction when committed for private pur-
poses.325 Moreover, piracy is only subject to universal jurisdiction when it occurs on the 
high seas (i.e., requiring that the crime be international in nature). Another similarity be-
tween piracy and treaty-based universal jurisdiction crimes is the incentive States have to 
deter and punish these crimes based upon self-interest. Genocide in a distant country 
may be ignored without serious political, economic or security consequences. However, 
if a State’s citizens were taken hostage or its ships were attacked by pirates, then it is an-
other matter. Given the ubiquity of air and sea travel, problems such as terrorism, aircraft 
hijacking, and hostage-taking affect States large and small, stable and unstable. The same 
is true for piracy, which currently affects both rich nations (such as the United States and 
Saudi Arabia) and poorer nations (such as Kenya and Yemen).326 A concerted, robust 
international response was necessary to curb the ever growing rate of airline hijackings 
in the 1960s.327 A similarly robust and coordinated international response has been nec-
essary to reduce the threat that Somali pirates pose to international shipping.328 Universal 
jurisdiction is a useful tool in fighting crimes such as piracy, hostage-taking, and hijack-
ing because “extradite or try” provisions eliminate safe havens and terra nullis, which 
these criminals tend to exploit.329 
Given the widespread interest States have in suppressing the treaty-based crimes of 
universal jurisdiction, the fact that these crimes less frequently implicate State actors, 
and the fact that the crimes are generally international in nature (meaning that a State ex-
ercising jurisdiction would be less likely to be seen as usurping the ‘rightful’ jurisdiction 
of another State), the exercise of universal jurisdiction over these crimes presents fewer 
thorny issues than the exercise of jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes. The concept of 
“extradite or try” has been fairly uncontroversial and has been incorporated into numer-
ous States’ domestic laws.330 That there has not been a ballooning of the exercise of 
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purely universal jurisdiction over treaty-based crimes is most likely attributable to the 
fact that interested States (based on territorial, active personality, or passive personality 
jurisdiction) generally pursue these cases.331 The modern piracy example, however, may 
suggest the return of commonly practiced universal jurisdiction over that crime.332 To 
date, such exercise of universal jurisdiction has only been controversial with the pirates 
themselves.333 
Modern examples of piracy and hijacking have demonstrated States’ willingness to 
enforce the “extradite or try” norm and the lack of international political uproar from 
such enforcement.334 The resulting framework of universal jurisdiction over these crimes 
has been relatively straightforward, uncontroversial, and has not been overwhelmed by a 
significant number of obviously politicized prosecutions. Though universal jurisdiction 
is hardly the most commonly used basis to bring cases against those who commit treaty-
based crimes, it is one method in a broad arsenal to address crimes that are of concern to 
a large number of States. 
2. Is Heinousness the Right Framework? 
Conceptually, heinousness does not appear to be the proper framework to apply to 
universal jurisdiction. The crimes of Somali pirates hardly measure up to acts of geno-
cide, yet universal jurisdiction appears to be the most efficient and effective means of 
addressing that particular problem. To date, Kenya’s application of universal jurisdiction 
has not generated international controversy, nor is it seen as usurping the prerogatives of 
another State. But if heinousness is the right metric to determine when universal jurisdic-
tion should be applied, why does it appear to be well received in the case of modern pi-
racy, but badly received when Spain or Belgium attempts to use universal jurisdiction in 
connection with war crimes and torture allegations? There is no question that part of the 
explanation is political. Jus cogens crimes are often committed by State actors, whereas 
treaty-based crimes are not. But, so long as universal jurisdiction involves one State sit-
ting in judgment of the acts of another State, it will be impossible to divorce the political 
and legal questions. 
This is not to suggest, as some commentators would, that universal jurisdiction 
should be reserved for treaty-based crimes and that acts of State should always be im-
mune to such jurisdiction.335 However, we should consider whether universal jurisdiction 
as exercised by a State over some crimes, regardless of how heinous, is not generally op-
timal. If this is indeed the case, we should conceptually de-link universal jurisdiction 
from heinousness; it would otherwise be senseless to claim that the application of univer-
sal jurisdiction is sui generis evidence of the heinousness of a particular crime if such 
jurisdiction is typically used to prosecute piracy, but not crimes against humanity. Part 
                                                                                                                                               
mark, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
 331. Consider, for example the U.S.’s willingness to capture foreign terrorists abroad accused of plotting acts 
of terrorism against the United States. 
 332. See Modern Piracy discussion, supra Part II.A. 
 333. See AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, supra note 271. 
 334. See, e.g., Schmemann, supra note 244. 
 335. See Kissinger, supra note 304. 
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III of this article considers what should serve as the threshold test for universal jurisdic-
tion if it is not heinousness. 
PART III 
For decades, universal jurisdiction has been tied to the concept that some crimes 
“shock the conscience,” thus making the exercise of jurisdiction by any State proper. 
This is morally satisfying, but not ultimately helpful, legally. After all, if a crime is terri-
bly heinous and shocks the conscience of good people in every society—such as the rape 
and murder of a child—but the crime can be adequately addressed by State authorities 
with territorial jurisdiction, would universal jurisdiction provide any concrete benefit, or 
would it simply confuse the issue of who should prosecute? An obvious response to this 
hypothetical is that universal jurisdiction should be reserved for crimes on a massive 
scale. But again, if the State where the crime took place is able to properly investigate 
and prosecute the crime, is there a role for universal jurisdiction? 
Furthermore, exercising jurisdiction based on the heinousness of a crime is likely 
to create uncertainty and may even disrupt the orderly relations between States.336 If a 
State cannot bargain in good faith with rebel groups because any other State can pass a 
universal jurisdiction statute and undermine a negotiated amnesty, the very exercise of 
universal jurisdiction may inadvertently lead to further bloodshed.337 Similarly, States 
could pass universal jurisdiction statutes in bad faith in order to justify politically moti-
vated prosecutions of enemies.338 
For opponents of universal jurisdiction, these arguments are generally sufficient to 
end the debate. The practical realities of international relations cannot be beholden to the 
woolly idealism of international law. Comments about genocide being a call to action for 
the entire world are all well and good for those who do not face the daunting task of try-
ing to end vicious wars as quickly and humanely as possible. But universal jurisdiction, 
properly understood and scrupulously applied, need not be an impediment to statecraft 
and can instead strengthen the hand of diplomats by fostering cooperation, reducing un-
certainty, and improving the efficacy of domestic and international law enforcement. 
What is required is to move away from a highly theoretical model of international juris-
diction based on a shared sense of moral outrage to a model of jurisdiction predicated on 
the theory that territorial jurisdiction often leads to non-optimal levels of prosecution and 
that transnational and international cooperation are necessary to achieve optimal levels of 
prosecution while preserving a defendant’s due process rights, enhancing stability, and 
reducing uncertainty in international relations. 
We can advance the cause of ending impunity without radically redefining sover-
eignty or threatening international stability. For existing crimes of universal jurisdiction, 
both treaty-based crimes and jus cogens crimes, we can implement a multi-level system 
of complementarity, based upon the model of the ICC. Such a model would recognize 
the primacy of territorial jurisdiction as inextricably linked to the concept of State sover-
eignty. As with the ICC, exceptions to the territorial rule of jurisdiction would exist for 
                                                          
 336. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 90; Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 188-89; ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 17. 
 337. See Kissinger, supra note 304. 
 338. See BASS, supra note 62, at 328. 
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instances in which that State was either unable or unwilling to try the perpetrator, lacked 
the necessary procedural safeguards or due process guarantees for a fair trial, or where 
there was a likelihood that any prosecution would result in a “slap on the wrist” to pre-
vent future prosecution. 
Next in the order of precedence in a multi-level system of complementarity would 
be any internationally-constituted tribunal (such as the ICC) with competent subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The ICC is a very new entity, so it remains difficult to judge its efficacy, 
but given the fact that it is never a party to a particular conflict and should have no polit-
ical motivations in pursuing cases, it should theoretically enjoy greater legitimacy than 
national prosecutions of international or foreign crimes.339 
There would again be exceptions when the crimes alleged fall outside the tribunals 
temporal or geographic limitations or the prosecutor declines to prosecute the case. The 
exercise of jurisdiction by tribunals would likely still leave a substantial number of 
crimes to be prosecuted. ICC jurisdiction, for example, is limited to the worst of the 
worst offenses such as genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and crimes 
against humanity.340 Even then, jurisdiction is limited to offenses that occur on such a 
large scale as to warrant the exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion in choosing to pro-
ceed.341 Torturers and low-level war criminals, for example, could very well escape 
prosecution. With respect to the treaty-based crimes, there are as of this time, no tribu-
nals which hear cases regarding these crimes. 
We would look to States exercising extraterritorial, but not universal jurisdiction as 
having the next most legitimate claim to prosecution. States would be permitted to assert 
active personality, passive personality, or protective principle jurisdiction over crimes for 
which universal jurisdiction has been deemed appropriate. States with a concrete link to 
the crime, even if it is not territorial, will be less subject to erroneous claims of political 
prosecution than truly disinterested States. Such exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
are also unlikely to open up a State’s courts to highly politicized contests between com-
peting groups, as was seen in the bringing of suits by Palestinians against Israeli authori-
ties and Israeli citizens against Palestinian leaders in Belgium’s courts.342 
Exceptions to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction would exist where there is 
no State willing to exercise jurisdiction, the relevant States are unable to establish a pri-
ma facie case, the States lack capacity to prosecute, there are potential due process is-
sues, or where there is the potential for a “slap on the wrist prosecution.”343 
Finally, we would look to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction 
should be exercised on an “extradite or try” basis, giving precedence in the order estab-
lished above to judicial systems with a recognized interest in trying the case. Despite all 
of the preceding layers of jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction ought to be maintained, if 
for no other reason than to ensure that no State should be turned into a safe haven for in-
ternational criminals against its will. Similarly, no State should find itself in the position 
                                                          
 339. See Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revo-
lution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 400-02 (2000). 
 340. Id. at 421-36. 
 341. ICC Statute, supra note 88. 
 342. See Discussion of Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Law, supra Part I.D.2. 
 343. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 44-45. 
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of Belgium, with its courts caught in the middle of essentially political struggles by vari-
ous opposing groups. Absent treaty requirements, the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
should remain permissive, not mandatory. 
With respect to future developments of universal jurisdiction, this article proposes 
no imposition of specific limits on universal jurisdiction’s growth. However, treaties re-
main the clearest and most stable vehicle for the growth of universal jurisdiction, given 
the political realities of universal jurisdiction and the critical role of sovereignty in our 
system of international relations. Treaties allow for greater clarity as to the nature of the 
offense and the rights and obligations of States in punishing those offenses. Heinousness 
should not be a requirement for expanding universal jurisdiction. Instead, the decision to 
expand universal jurisdiction should remain completely within the purview of States. 
This article recommends that any potential expansion of universal jurisdiction be meas-
ured according to the following metrics: 
1. Is domestic prosecution an insufficient deterrent? 
2. Would universal jurisdiction result in a more optimal level of prosecution and 
deterrence? 
3. Could the same results be achieved with a less drastic remedy than universal 
jurisdiction, i.e., formalizing systems of cross-border cooperation and requests 
for judicial assistance, streamlining extradition processes, propagating uniform 
minimum standards for evidence collection to facilitate cross border prosecu-
tions, etc.344 
In some instances, the appropriate response to non-optimal levels of prosecution 
will be informal transnational cooperation between two States. In other cases, a group of 
States may decide to formalize methods of cooperation to combat cross-border crimes 
like drug trafficking. At the far end of the spectrum, States may decide that the only way 
to prevent anarchy and lawlessness in terra nullis is to apply universal jurisdiction to cer-
tain crimes in certain circumstances. In each case, the method of cooperation and the 
type of extraterritorial jurisdiction will depend on how much the States want to control 
the behavior at issue, and what level of extraterritorial jurisdiction or cooperation is nec-
essary to obtain an optimal level of prosecution and deterrence. 
As a result, States may choose to extend universal jurisdiction to drug traffick-
ing345 (which, given the ancillary crime it causes, is arguably heinous) or cybercrimes346 
(which in many cases are not generally considered to be heinous crimes). The concept of 
heinousness would be de-linked from universal jurisdiction in a tacit acknowledgment of 
the fact that some heinous crimes can be properly combated without universal jurisdic-
tion, whereas certain far less heinous crimes cannot. 
                                                          
 344. These additional methods of cooperation have been codified in various treaties, including the E.U. Ex-
tradition Convention and the Hijacking Convention. There is also a convention on the taking of foreign evi-
dence in civil and commercial matters, which can serve as a precedent for creating such a convention on taking 
evidence in criminal matters.  
 345. See Anne H. Geraghty, Universal Jurisdiction and Drug Trafficking: A Tool for Fighting One of the 
World’s Most Pervasive Problems, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 371 (2004). 
 346. See Jennifer J. Rho, Blackbeards of the Twenty-First Century: Holding Cybercriminals Liable under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 695 (2007). 
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CONCLUSION 
The development of universal jurisdiction, from its initial application to piracy, to 
international human rights abuses, to terrorism, was often unclear, uneven, and incon-
sistent. We would do best to reexamine the widely held belief that universal jurisdiction 
is reserved for heinous crimes and that the indicia of a truly heinous crime is the fact that 
it is subject to universal jurisdiction. There is much that is morally satisfying in that ap-
proach; however, State practice does not bear the heinousness theory out. If we are to 
look at the law of universal jurisdiction as it truly is and not as we wish it to be, we must 
consider the numerous crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, not because they are hei-
nous, but because universal jurisdiction is the most effective means of deterring them. 
Given the strong evidence that piracy was not considered a particularly heinous crime, 
we cannot relegate piracy to the status of a “curious accident” of universal jurisdiction, 
and focus on the truly awful crimes we believe deserve universal jurisdiction instead. 
The current example of Somali piracy, a crime that is hardly heinous in comparison to 
genocide or crimes against humanity, is proof that if there was no ages-old universal ju-
risdiction for piracy, we would need to invent it. 
Should we still find there is a need to single out the “worst of the worst” offenses 
against international law, we can consider the fact that these are the specific crimes sub-
ject to the ICC’s jurisdiction. Perhaps the measure of our strongest condemnation of 
these crimes is not the fact that they are subject to universal jurisdiction, but that the 
States of the world have created an entire international legal apparatus to address these 
crimes—to de-politicize prosecutions and to ensure that the obscurity of a particular 
mass murder or war crime is not the basis of its perpetrators’ impunity. Indeed, given the 
rather poor record of States in trying international human rights abusers under universal 
jurisdiction, this should be a welcome change. 
Universal jurisdiction is not merely a political tool or an aspirational wish of hu-
man rights advocates. But, universal jurisdiction has its limits. Properly considered, uni-
versal jurisdiction is a backstop to prevent impunity. When States with legitimate inter-
ests in prosecution cannot or will not do so, and there is no international legal regime to 
punish particular conduct, that is when we should turn to universal jurisdiction. It should 
not be relied upon as the first line of defense to deter and punish international crime. 
 
45
Kazemi: Justifications for Universal Jurisdiction: Shocking the Conscienc
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
